Does Hiring Large SAP Consulting Firms Work as Political Insurance?

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Executive Summary

  • A primary reason for hiring the major SAP consulting firms is for political insurance.
  • This means that if the project does poorly, that the decision makers can say they went with a major brand.

Introduction

Large SAP consulting companies have a long history of ripping off their clients. However, they continue to be used.

Why?

Well, one hypothesis is that large consulting companies provide political cover for decision-makers. Even though Deloitte or Accenture or WiPro or Cognizant or another SAP consulting firm constantly take advantage of their clients, they are at the very least “major brands.” Looked at this way, they can be seen as political insurance.

Paying to Get Robbed?

I recall a project where IBM was not getting what it wanted and they declared:

“We cannot guarantee the success of the project if XYZ happens.”

I remember thinking, how does IBM guarantee the success of anything? You pay IBM and they support a project. There is no guarantee.

The risk is with the client. All that IBM does is bill the customer, there is no “guarantee” provided by any consulting firm.

How SAP Consulting Firms Increase Project Risk

These firms greatly increase the risk of failure of projects. Here is why:

  • The Consistently Poor Quality of Product Information Emanating from SAP Consulting Firms: The information they provide is of such self-serving and inaccurate quality. If you cannot find out what is true from the SI, then you are destined to implement incorrectly.
  • The Inability to Contradict SAP: The SAP consulting firms compete with each other to gain the approval of SAP. They will agree with SAP on anything they say, creating a fake impression of an independent third party.
  • Intense Hierarchy: No one but the top people on a project have any ability to determine what information will be released to a customer. All of the technical resources are entirely subordinate to the senior members, who are in turn subordinate to the most senior members within the consulting firms where policy is made.

Pushing Companies into High-Risk Implementations

We covered the Revlon S/4HANA implementation in the article What Was the Real Story with the Revlon S/4HANA Failure?, and we concluded that Revlon never had any potential of taking S/4HANA live, given the timing of the implementation and the maturity of the application at the time of implementation. This brings up the topic of the ethics of recommending software that as a consulting firm you know will fail as we covered in the article Is it Right to Lead Clients into SAP Software Failure?

In fact, in discussions with a number of senior members/partners at large and small SAP consulting firms about the readiness of S/4HANA and other SAP applications as well as the availability of resources, I noted how the conversation tends to turn cold when I have brought up topics related to implement-ability. The most senior people in these organizations generally don’t seem to like discussing the implement-ability of sold work.

The comments that have heard repeatedly is something like the following:

“We will worry about implementation after, not before we sell the work. First, we need to sell the work.”

In fact, in nearly every interaction with a partner resource, or a sales resource, and I have had many, as soon as I begin to mention implementability or reality, the tension in that relationship quickly rises. Questions around implementability often has lead me to be categorized as negative and have dramatically reduced the congeniality of the relationship. After one tense exchange at a dinner over HANA, where I brought up the many issues with HANA, the salesperson (who was, of course, paying for my meal) said to me.

“Shaun, don’t you think that SAP is a large company with a lot of resources and that they will just figure it out?”

I said no and explained why.

Now four years after that meal, and as covered in the article The SAP Layoffs and a Brightwork Warning on HANA, the bloom is off the HANA rose, and SAP did not figure it out.

In the movie How to Lose Friends and Alienate People, a British import runs afoul of all of the established rules in the celebrity media business. The way to do the same with software salespeople or partners is to bring up issues around implement-ability. The best way to push a career forward when dealing with these types is to pretend that none of the issues exist. And this is how projects of course also fail. 

After enough of these experiences, combined with reading many case studies, I have concluded that the major consulting companies do not factor implement-ability into their sales process. They approach the sales process like a newborn baby, assuming that everything will work perfectly if they can just “get the work.”

Most senior members or partners I have worked with don’t live in a plane of reality. They exist in a fantasyland which puts the sale above all else. The best salespeople tend to make the prospect the most excited, and this is more effective when the salesperson/partner is themselves deluded. The partner/salesperson then transfer this delusion to the prospect. This is my hypothesis as to why the best salespeople tend to be the most divorced from reality and end up with the most blown up projects. 

The Problem With Not Incorporating Implementation Issues into the Sales Process

However, what if the application is not ready to be implemented? What if resources cannot be found to perform the implementation? These are all things to worry about (a process that is called “planning,” not after you have sold the project. In fact, these considerations should influence what work, and what projects are sold. One does not sell a defective or incomplete building design without any idea of where the labor will come from and then worry about these things after the project is sold. The project is being sold on the basis that these items have been worked out. These conversations sometimes end with a warning that goes something like this.

“It is important that we don’t do or say anything that makes the prospect uncomfortable with the proposal we have put forward.”

Pushing Companies into Wasteful Expenditures

Therefore the waste is worse than just their billing rate, they push companies to implement the worst systems (the most immature, worst fit for the requirements — the ones that the consulting firm specializes in billing for) and often in the worst way for their clients.

It is similar to paying robbers to come into your house to rob you.

Typically you can just get robbed for free. If made aware of this burglars all around the world would be quite jealous of the SAP consulting companies. They have to break into houses and banks and steal things — but they don’t get paid to do it. SAP consulting companies actually flip the scenario around, so they are paid to screw over their clients and give them highly destructive advice.

Given Their Track Record, Why Do the Major SAP Consulting Firms Continue to Sell Work?

As observed by Ahmed Azmi.

“Customers really don’t have better options unless they’re willing and capable of doing the work themselves. Many don’t have that ability in house. It’s much easier to outsource everything to an SI and take what they can get. If the system under-delivers, they must downplay the problems because they are part of the project.”

Where Does Competition Occur in SAP Consulting?

The description laid out in the previous comment essentially proposes the SAP consulting firms as being selected primarily for appearances (insurance, lack of personal responsibility in selecting a “brand” etc..).

This means that the various consulting firms “compete” but only within the context of agreeing with whatever SAP says. Therefore customers can choose from what amounts to the same rigged advice from any of the companies.

  • The consulting firms do not compete on which can implement. in fact, because the implementation history of each is unknown. References are provided, but often references are not checked or not sufficiently checked. Wipro is on record in court as saying that they should not be reprimanded or held to account for providing false case studies, as the responsibility is entirely with the client to verify the false case studies they provide, as we covered in the article How to Understand Wipro’s Position on Lying. If we take the specific example of IBM and AI, IBM has sold (according to IBM) over 20,000 AI projects and continues to sell these projects even though there is little evidence of AI doing what IBM sells it to do, and IBM massively failed in its own AI project/product called Watson as we covered in the article How IBM is Distracting from the Watson Failure to Sell More AI and Machine Learning.
  • SAP recommends companies that follow SAP’s directives, always placing client interests at the bottom of the trough.

Those that do what SAP says, get more business. In this sense the more you lie for SAP, the more business you get.

How Large SAP Consulting Firms Repeatedly Get it Wrong

In fact, in our research into the media output of SAP consulting firms, we find almost no variance between the information published by any of the large firms. This would not be such a terrible thing if the information were true, but the issue is that so much of the published information is not true. That means that a wide variety of consulting entities are publishing the same false information……because it comes centrally from SAP. Areas which the consulting partners have repeated that turned out to be false are just too many to mention, but here are a few examples.

Accenture as with all the major SAP consulting firms promoted Leonardo. As we covered in the article Our 2019 Observation: SAP Leonardo is Dead, Leonardo is now a dead product, something we predicted would happen back in 2017 in the article Why SAP Leonardo Seems Fake. We could make this an extremely long article with initiatives that SAP has proposed, that were supported by the major SAP consulting firms that ended up being non-items a few years after being introduced by SAP and hyped by the SAP consulting ecosystem. 

Therefore, the competition is greatly based upon who can lie better for SAP. And companies cannot count on any large SAP consulting firm to keep them away from wasteful implementations, because the consulting firms have no fiduciary duty to the client (that is they have taken no pledge or are not regulated to place the client’s interests ahead of their own interests.) This means that the SAP consulting firm simply wants the most implementation/upgrade/etc activity possible.

Furthermore, these large SAP consulting firms are not held accountable for their inaccuracy. They simply make new statements, without their previous advice being analyzed. Here is the accuracy measured of one of the early promoters of HANA that we covered in the article A Study into John Appleby’s HANA Accuracy, and here is the article of a PwC resource on S/4HANA that we covered in the article Mark Chaflen Accuracy Checker on S/4HANA. These are not aberrations, these were just the instances where we went through the effort to verify their accuracy. If we measured the accuracy of other information providers from the major SAP consulting (and most of the smaller ones as well) the accuracy would be roughly similar.

A primary approach to improving forecast accuracy as well as decision making is to remove biased and inaccurate inputs as we covered in the article A Frank Analysis of Sales Forecast Bias. However, this is not done when selecting SAP consulting firms. The same firms continue to lie about SAP year in and year out, and they continue to be rewarded with more SAP work.

Consulting Companies as a Universal Problem in Software Selection

We wrote the article From IT to the Business: Go Jump Off a Bridge to describe the problems that IT has in selecting good software for the business. Therefore it was interesting to find this quote which explains the same problem, but in a specific niche of software called course development software and from a blog by the course software company Playwrite. What is also curious about this software category is that it is a category that Brightwork Reseach & Analysis has no experienced studying.

As Explained by the Playwrite Blog

“LMSs are designed for the misinformed 💰people

Imagine a committee (when have committees ever made bad decisions?) composed of administrators, IT people, and the token student and/or teacher. For these committees, due diligence in LMS selection starts with a giant features list (one often found through a Google search or provided by fancy consultants). This list determines the “best” match for them.

I use quotes around “best” because the people helping them make this decision are often aggressive sales staff from LMS companies. As you might imagine, on the LMS side, this leads to an arms race of features— one that plays off the good intentions and fears of the committee.

The LMS with the most features #wins

The committee, with feature-FOMO, throws money at the problem.

This leads to LMS software that is a rat’s nest of features that only “power users” can understand. Those features require conferences and time-sucking, on-site training for the primary users (students and teachers) to get any work done. The original committee might even regret their decision, but now they’re trapped by the contract—often a contract that lasts as long as 5 years (light-years in internet time). In the end, this is a losing game for everyone.”

Rigging Software Selections

This is the exact issue that we have observed in all the areas of enterprise software that we have covered. It allows the vendors with the largest budgets to hack the software selection process. The consulting companies work in conjunction with the largest vendors to redirect the purchase to the most expensive solutions, the solutions where they can bill the most hours.

Building Up Software Vendors

In the SAP space, SAP has been built up enormously through consulting companies singing their praises. Why? Because consulting companies found that they could make the most money from SAP implementations. The highest cost implementation (many of those costs translating to billing hours) then promote an ecosystem of consulting companies to specialize in that solution. Not because the solution is good technically, but because of the revenue stream it creates for the consulting ecosystem.

Faking Independence

The consulting companies present themselves as independent from the vendors, when in fact they have long term partnerships that go beyond agreements to work together to really agreements to conspire against other vendors to move the customer to the most expensive solutions and to only the software that the consulting company has a partnership with.

SAP consulting firms routinely provide inflated and false information about SAP — for one reason. They want to bill for SAP projects. And they do not care what the right solution is for their clients. Consuling firms use a combination of billing rate and billing margin to determine which products to recommend. 

The Software RFP

One of the primary ways the consulting firm takes control of the selection process to redirect the selection towards their preferred vendor is to be in charge of writing up the RFP, which we covered in the article How to Rig an RFP to Maximize Billing Hours.

Do IT Consulting Companies Have a Fiduciary Duty?

Let us begin this article by evaluating the term fiduciary:

“Fiduciary: In a fiduciary relationship, one person, in a position of vulnerability, justifiably vests confidence, good faith, reliance and trust in another whose aid, advice or protection is sought in some matter. In such a relation good conscience requires the fiduciary to act at all times for the sole benefit and interest of the one who trusts.” – Wikipedia

When one is speaking to a financial advisor, as a recent episode of the PBS program by Frontline explained, the first question should be

“Are you a fiduciary?

Very few of them are in fact fiduciaries — this means that if not, the advisor will most likely steer you to investments that offer the highest margins for him or her. And the highest margin investments for the financial advisor are often the worst investments for the client (bad investments sweeten the pot for the advisor by offering a higher compensation to the advisor). Financial entities work by employing larger number so salespeople — which instead of being called “salespeople” are called “financial advisors.” However, the term financial advisor is not an official designation. Aside from having to pass no test for competency, there is no test for financial bias.

What This Means

What this all means that basically financial advisors can recommend pretty much whatever they like and cannot be held accountable for providing bad advice. That is they have no fiduciary duty to their clients and therefore have no fiduciary liability. In fact, their only measurement by the company that employs them is how much money they make for the company.

This is a primary reason so much retirement savings has been directed towards high risk and “complicated” and poorly performing investment products like annuities.

How This Applies to IT Consulting

Frontline did an excellent job of explaining how the financial industry works — by employing large numbers of salespeople who are pretending to be investment advisors. Often the language used by “investment advisors,” makes it seem as if they are offering good products to their clients, however, an investigation into this matter indicates that what they show their clients is entirely dependent upon how they are compensated.

In IT consulting, prestigious consulting companies such as Accenture, Deloitte, IBM, KPMG, Cap Gemini also seem to imply that they look out for their clients’ interests, but in fact they are entirely unregulated and because they lack a fiduciary duty they have extremely limited legal liability (fiduciary liability) if they provide advice that hurts their clients. It is extremely difficult to get judgements against IT consultancies because their legal liability is so low. In the case of Marin Country vs. Deloitte, Marin Country charged Deloitte with bribing their chief auditor — who rather conveniently left Marin County for a position of a Senior Manager at Deloitte very soon after approving $3 million dollars in consulting services.

The implementation provided by Deloitte were deemed to be incompetent and inexperienced by Marin Country and the system Deloitte installed never worked properly. However, because Deloitte is not a fiduciary, Marin was forced to go after Deloitte for civil racketeering (see this article for more details).

Understanding the Motivations of the IT Consulting Partner

The main salesperson at an IT consultancy is called a partner. IT consultancy partners have very high consulting service quotas — often around $2 million per year. Partners don’t do much work on projects, their job is to sell. Senior level resources in consulting companies that cannot sell are called directors, and their status is lower than a partner.

Partners are highly restricted on which products they can recommend. They are essentially compelled to recommend the major applications from SAP and Oracle, two software vendors that have agreed to outsource their consulting to these companies.

However, there are three important issues where are almost entirely unexamined in the enterprise software industry:

Issue 1: Consulting Companies Keep Clients in the Dark

The consulting partner never informs their client that they recommended software because they happen to have resources which they can bill for — and they do not disclose that the nature of their business with SAP or Oracle is completely different from their relationship with smaller software vendors. The partner does not explain the quota which he or she is under and how they will lose their job if they do not meet this quota.

All of these mechanizations are hidden from view by the client. Clients and we have spoken with many of them, seem to think that the IT consultancy is providing their recommendations based upon the actual capabilities of the software and the match with the client’s business requirements.

Issue 2: Choosing Inappropriate Alternatives

In most cases, neither of these software vendors (SAP or Oracle) will be the best alternatives for the client — but the partner must recommend them because these are the applications for which the IT consultancy has trained resources. And resources that can bill hours.

In fact, SAP and Oracle became two of the largest and most successful enterprise software vendors not as much due to the quality of their software products as much as due to their special business relationship with large consulting companies — essentially corrupting their function. (we say corrupt, but in truth the advisory function of IT consultancies has always been for sale, it is just that SAP and Oracle are currently the high bidders)

Issue 3: Blocking Out Vendors that the Consulting Company Does not Specialize In

If the partner recommends another application, that software vendor will tend to want to bring in their own consulting resources (who know the application) and this will cut into the partner’s managed billing hours. Partners that allowed this to happen would be fired from the IT consultancy. Therefore the system is set up to allow no deviation and to never place the clients’ interest ahead of the IT consultancy.

Misunderstanding IT Risk By Using a Single Prime Contractor

After a detailed analysis of this topic, it is clear that the standard approaches to managing risk on enterprise software selection and implementations such as hiring a name brand consulting company, purchasing name brand software or paying for IT analysts like Gartner do not work. This should be entirely obvious at this point.

Some journalists will bemoan the high failure rate of IT projects but will fail to point out the clear reasons as to why. Most of the advice they give and issues they highlight really seem to be just nibbling around the edges of the problem. (Actually, most of them can’t because the entities that are most responsible for the high failure rate of IT projects are major advertisers in the publications they write for). However, the failed approach to risk management is still the dominant approach to managing project risk. This chapter explains why each approach does not work. We will start off with one of the most commonly followed strategies.

Using a Single Prime Contractor

This section will cover the frequently applied risk mitigation strategy of using a prime contractor, a frequently employed strategy that is commonly thought to mitigate risk, but like many risk mitigation strategies, no evidence is ever presented that it actually does mitigate risk. This myth has simply grown from the logic that it would seem to reduce risk if there are fewer points of risk, that is fewer parties that are ultimately responsible for the risk on the contractor side. However, this comes from a basic misunderstanding about the behavior of most prime contractors.

It is a well-known feature many types of projects, and not merely for IT projects, that many buyers frequently prefer to hire a single prime contractor to implement their projects. This prime contractor is typically a large consulting company. This is done, at least partially, under the concept that the buyer will have a single party to hold accountable – or as the terrible saying goes “one throat to choke. This strategy has driven buyers to reduce the number of entities that they directly hire downward. This means the approved vendor list is very short – and quite often shockingly immune to the actual performance of the suppliers/large consulting companies. One client, I am aware of only uses either CSC or Accenture for its IT work, both of which have provided very poor value to this buyer for a number of years. However, as much as the project managers at this buyer may complain about the performance of these firms, they have no latitude to choose another firm. To this buyer, “competition” means switching the IT contracts between the different firms. This exact issue of a very limited number of suppliers being called upon by an enterprise software buyer arose during the now well-known HealthCare.gov website fiasco.

What Can Be Learned from HealthCare.gov

The company that won the HealthCare.gov contract in initially, CGI, had underperformed on US government contracts for many years, but this did not stop them from receiving the HealthCare.gov contract. When the problems began to become well known regarding the website, some connected the dots when they figured out who had received the contract. CGI is a big firm, but even though the initial failure of HeathCare.gov is in little doubt, the government will not be receiving money back from CGI, but instead, the government paid CGI in full.

Myths of Hiring Prime Contractors

This is one of the great myths of hiring a prime contractor – that the prime contractor in some way “guarantees the project.” However, while this impression is certainly given during the sales process, however oral statements about supporting the project or being dedicated to the project don’t mean much. What actually matters is how the consulting contracts are worded, and the contracts created by prime contractors protect them from liability quite well.

How do they do this you might ask?

They are typically responsible for meeting milestones – which they often control as they frequently manage the project – but they are almost never on the hook for the performance of the system. During the HealthCare.gov scandal, Obama complained that the way that IT contracts are bid should be analyzed by the government, however, apparently he meant that the way IT contracts are bid for the government will be analyzed by some other administration. This is because when Accenture received the contract to fix the site and CGI’s contract was not renewed, it was not a competitive bid. In fact, the bid process was managed in the same way that the awarding of the initial contract to CGI was performed, which was also not a competitive bid. The reason given is the same as many of the corrupt bids that were given out to defense contractors during the second Gulf War, that there was simply no time – because aggressive timelines would have to be met. Interestingly, Accenture has one of poorer reputations for implementation success. Interestingly, Accenture has a poorer reputation as an implementer than CGI. However, the government most private companies cannot even think about giving contracts to anyone for but “the usual suspects.” This is because both CGI and Accenture heavily lobby the government for contracts, with CGI receiving $8 billion in government contracts. These are firms that in one shape or form pay off government decision-makers in order to control the flow of contracts in their direction.

According to OpenSecrets, CGI paid $800,000 since 2006 on a variety of contracts, actually a very small amount of money when compared to many other firms – particularly defense contractors. However, even these values underestimate the effect of the lobbying, as highly placed employees rotate between the government and these private entities, meaning that if you are a government decision maker, awarding contracts to the right private entity can often mean a very good paying job and job security when you have completed your “rotation” through “public service.”

Past Performance

All of these reasons are why the prior performance of these companies, which one may naively think would be paramount to the decision-making process, do not seem to control decision making. CGI already had multiple problems in creating health care registries before it received the HealthCare.gov contract. CGI has also had successful implementations, however, there is little doubt that CGI was nowhere close to the best company to award the contract to for HealthCare.gov. The best company or series of companies would have been smaller web development companies and to not make anyone of them the prime contractor. However, because these types of companies do not sufficient lobbying muscle, they can’t win these types of contracts, something that is explained by the following quotation:

“Evan Burfield, who founded the relatively small company that worked with CGI to build Recovery.gov, says the problem lies more in a federal procurement apparatus that makes it nearly impossible for an agile newcomer to bid on projects that in the private sector would take much less time and money. Plus, with so many contractors, everyone could technically fulfill the requirements in their statement of work, and the thing can still not work in the end.”[1]

The Nature of Government Contracts

The uncompetitive nature of the government contracting process for IT services is absolutely not unique to the government. These same consulting firms that sell to the public sector also sell to the private sector. This point was missed by pro-private sector or pro “free market” voices, who assigned blame for the botched HealthCare.gov website on the fact that it was a government project. However, these voices emanated from entities that either did not understand how the system works, or knew but was deliberately providing misleading information in their statements. CGI is a private company, not a government entity.

Secondly, botched IT implementations are incredibly common in the private sector, just as they are in the public sector. Certainly, the project’s overseeing agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, put the project in a difficult situation by not completing the requirements in a way that gave CGI enough time to complete the web site’s creation, however, many private sector companies that I have worked for have been guilty of doing the same thing on a very frequent basis. In fact, I cannot recall a project where the complaint was not made at some point during the endeavor that either the requirements took to long to gather, or when they were gathered they were either incomplete or not sufficiently documented.

Changing the IT Procurement Approach

The unfortunate fact is that who one knows is far more important than the firm’s performance in acquiring IT contracts. Both the government and the private sector could receive much better values by changing their IT procurement approach, and they could do so very easily, and one of the easiest ways is to simply stop awarding contracts to large consulting companies as prime contractors. They could replace them by simply building their own teams of contractors, or hiring smaller consulting firms, but they choose to drive most of the business to the giant consulting firms. Smaller firms and independent contractors are more motivated to provide good work because they do not have the brand names and lobbying/sales muscle to repeatedly obtain contracts after not performing on previous contracts.

The Reality of Setting Up Prime Contractors

While it might be a nice idea to hire a prime contractor, often a massive consulting conglomerate, and let them hire subcontractors – but it does not work for software implementations.[2] This strategy is frequently deployed, but as with any strategy that one is relying upon to reduce risk it is important to ask the question as to whether the evidence actually exists that it is true.  Here are the well-documented reasons why the prime contractor model is flawed:

  1. Control Over Advice Offered by Subcontractors: The prime contractor model results in the subcontractors serving the desires of the prime contractor (often having their opinions censored by the prime contractor – which has happened to me on several occasions as a subcontractor) and not primarily serving the desires of the end client. This should be entirely obvious at this point, and those buyers that have not realized this are simply not paying attention.
  2. Lack of Disclosure: The large consulting companies have a large number of partnerships and arrangements that work against their client’s interests, but that their clients never know about. When one has a financial relationship with another entity that could work against the interests of one’s client, that relationship is supposed to be disclosed. However, with the major consulting companies these relationships are never disclosed. Larger consulting companies have more of these financial relationships than smaller consulting companies, making their advice quite dubious as to its accuracy.
  3. Legal Contracts Overprotect the Prime Contractor: The end client receives precious little risk mitigation benefit because the legal contracts are written by the prime contractor essentially remove themselves from legal liability. Major consulting companies are so habituated to dissatisfied clients that they have how to manage them down to a science, including the legal aspect.

Conclusion

The competition between the SAP consulting firms is within a very narrow context, and mostly not what is good for customers. If one chooses Deloitte or Accenture there is little practical difference in the quality of information that the customer receives. There are differences among technical skills, but particularly the language skills and organizational skills with the Indian firms being worse than the US/Europe heritage firms, but on the other hand the US/Europe heritage firms are considerably more expensive.

The prime contractor model is durable and widely deployed, however, there is no evidence that using a prime contractor reduces risk, and in fact, there is considerable evidence that it does not. Buyers should replace simplistic platitudes such as “one throat to choke,”[3] with an actual analysis of the evidence into the history of the prime contractor model. If they do, they will find that this model actually increases risk. Managing IT projects is not something that can be outsourced. A successful model is one where the buyer takes an active management role in the project but hires the necessary expertise that they do not have in-house.

The Cost of “Political Insurance”

The political insurance that decision makers obtain from selecting one of the major SAP consulting firms does exist, but it comes at an enormous cost, and not only greatly increases the costs of implementation, but also increases the risk of failure. Therefore, while perhaps functional for the decision maker, it is dysfunctional for the companies that end up paying the consulting bill.

The Problem: Tolerating False Information

It is amazing to how many of the clients accept lying from both SAP and the consulting firm. By not calling out the lying, the client encourages more of it. The fact is both SAP and SAP consulting firms lie, and they lie a lot — and we have the evidence to prove it.

The intent of the lying is to be able to charge more for things that are often not true and to cover up previous lies that were told to try to sell or otherwise influence. Many customers seem to have a problem processing that they are being continually lied to by these companies.

The more lying is tolerated, the more SAP and the consulting company will continue to lie.

Being Part of the Solution: What to Do About SAP Consulting Firms

We can provide feedback from multiple SAP accounts that provide realistic information around SAP products — and this reduces the dependence on biased entities like and all of the large SAP consulting firms that parrot what SAP says. We offer fact-checking services that are entirely research-based and that can stop inaccurate information dead in its tracks. SAP and the consulting firms rely on providing information without any fact-checking entity to contradict the information they provide. When SAP or their consulting firm are asked to explain these discrepancies, we have found that they further lie to the customer/client and often turn the issue around on the account, as we covered in the article How SAP Will Gaslight You When Their Software Does Not Work as Promised.

If you need independent advice and fact-checking that is outside of the SAP and SAP consulting system, reach out to us with the form below or with the messenger to the bottom right of the page.

Financial Disclosure

Financial Bias Disclosure

Neither this article nor any other article on the Brightwork website is paid for by a software vendor, including Oracle, SAP or their competitors. As part of our commitment to publishing independent, unbiased research; no paid media placements, commissions or incentives of any nature are allowed.

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References

Depillis, Lyndia, Meet CGI Federal, the Company Behind the Botched Launch of HealthCare.gov. The Washington Post. October 16, 2013

Enterprise Software Risk Book

Software RiskRethinking Enterprise Software Risk: Controlling the Main Risk Factors on IT Projects

Rethinking Enterprise Software Risk: Controlling the Main Risk Factors on IT Projects

Better Managing Software Risk

The software implementation is risky business and success is not a certainty. But you can reduce risk with the strategies in this book. Undertaking software selection and implementation without approximating the project’s risk is a poor way to make decisions about either projects or software. But that’s the way many companies do business, even though 50 percent of IT implementations are deemed failures.

Finding What Works and What Doesn’t

In this book, you will review the strategies commonly used by most companies for mitigating software project risk–and learn why these plans don’t work–and then acquire practical and realistic strategies that will help you to maximize success on your software implementation.

Chapters

Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Enterprise Software Risk Management
Chapter 3: The Basics of Enterprise Software Risk Management
Chapter 4: Understanding the Enterprise Software Market
Chapter 5: Software Sell-ability versus Implementability
Chapter 6: Selecting the Right IT Consultant
Chapter 7: How to Use the Reports of Analysts Like Gartner
Chapter 8: How to Interpret Vendor-Provided Information to Reduce Project Risk
Chapter 9: Evaluating Implementation Preparedness
Chapter 10: Using TCO for Decision Making
Chapter 11: The Software Decisions’ Risk Component Model