The Real Story on The Vietnam War and JFK's Withdrawal Plans

Table of Contents: Select a Link to be Taken to That Section

Executive Summary

The explanation of the Vietnam War is filled with false assertions, which means very few people understand the real story of Vietnam.
A primary question of the war was whether JFK would have pulled out if he were not assassinated.

Introduction

An active area of debate is whether JFK would have pulled out of Vietnam. In this article, we will review different areas of evidence on this topic.

JFK’s Interview With Cronkite on Vietnam

The interview with Walter Cronkite is sometimes introduced as evidence that JFK would pull out from Vietnam.

“JFK knew the war was for South Vietnam to win or lose.”

This is shown in the following video.

An Analysis of the Accuracy of JFK’s Assertions in the Cronkite Interview

It made sense to parse JFK’s words to determine his mindset with Vietnam.

Item #1: Ho Chi Minh Was a Communist or Just an Authentic Leader?

First, Ho Chi Minh is not a communist. At that time, anyone who the US wanted to depose was a “communist.”
Second, the entire escapade is a US construction. I will provide evidence for this in a few paragraphs.

But JFK begins by providing false information in these two claims.

Item #2: What Does JFK Mean When He Says “The People” of Vietnam

Who are “the people of Vietnam” in JFK’s explanation, because the people of Vietnam were predominantly aligned with Ho Chi Minh, who the US was trying to defeat, not the US puppet government of Vietnam, the so-called South Vietnamese, that was recycled elites that had been supported or puppets of the French.

Item #3: What Does JFK Mean When He Says “The Government”

The following quote is also where JFK tries to cover up for the US puppet government.

“The government has gotten out of touch with the people, we thought the repressions of the Buddhists was very unwise.”

Who is the government?

Did JFK mean the puppet government supported by the US or the authentic government which was under Ho Chi Minh’s leadership?

The answer is that when JFK used the term “the government of Vietnam,” he was referring to the South Vietnamese puppet government. JFK wanted “the people of Vietnam” to rally around the US’s hand-picked puppet. JFK does not broach the subject in the interview or anywhere else that I can find as to why would “the people” support some person that the CIA picked to lead them?

Item #4: What “Struggle” Is JFK Referring To?

In the following quote from the interview, JFK discusses the struggle.

“The government will try to win back support for this very essential struggle.”

What struggle is that exactly?

The struggle to continue the multi-century domination of Vietnam by foreign powers in a way that does not reflect the desires of the Vietnamese people?

There is no other way of interpreting this than being the struggle JFK is referring to.

JFK finishes with.

“I don’t agree with those that say we should withdraw.”

Well, why not? Let us review the status of the South Vietnamese government.

The government is fake.
Diem was never elected and had no experience that would support him being the leader of Vietnam.
The South Vietnamese government comprises ex-French colonial kleptocrats that the US should not want to be associated with if they say they support participatory governments.
Diem had no support, and his victory would have likely meant a Shah of Iran situation in Vietnam.

A good synopsis of Diem’s rule is explained in the following quotation.

Diệm refused to hold the reunification elections, on the basis that the State of Vietnam was not a signatory to the Geneva Accords. He then proceeded to strengthen his autocratic and nepotistic rule over the country. A constitution was written by a rubber stamp legislature which gave Diệm the power to create laws by decree and arbitrarily give himself emergency powers.[2] Dissidents, both communist and nationalist, were jailed and executed in the thousands and elections were routinely rigged. Opposition candidates were threatened with being charged for conspiring with the Viet Cong, which carried the death penalty, and in many areas, large numbers of ARVN troops were sent to stuff ballot boxes.[3]
Diệm kept the control of the nation firmly within the hands of his brothers and their in-laws and promotions in the ARVN were given on the basis of religion and loyalty rather than merit. Two unsuccessful attempts had been made to depose Diệm; in 1960, a paratroop revolt was quashed after Diệm stalled negotiations to buy time for loyalists to put down the coup attempt, while a 1962 palace bombing by two Republic of Vietnam Air Force pilots failed to kill him.[4] South Vietnam’s Buddhist majority had long been discontented with Diệm’s strong favoritism towards Catholics. Public servants and army officers had long been promoted on the basis of religious preference, and government contracts, US economic assistance, business favors and tax concessions were preferentially given to Catholics. With Diệm remaining intransigent in the face of escalating Buddhist demands for religious equality, sections of society began calling for his removal from power. The key turning point came shortly after midnight on 21 August, when Nhu’s Special Forces raided and vandalised Buddhist pagodas across the country, arresting thousands of monks and causing a death toll estimated to be in the hundreds.[8] Numerous coup plans had been explored by the army before, but the plotters intensified their activities with increased confidence after the administration of US President John F. Kennedy authorised the US embassy to explore the possibility of a leadership change.[9] – Wikipedia

JFK’s Change in Perspective

What is curious after seeing this interview was to observe how much it differed from his view of the situation earlier in his career.

As a young congressman in 1951, Kennedy went to Vietnam to look over the situation. He got the standard embassy briefing, but then “asked sharply why the Vietnamese should be expected to fight to keep their country part of France.” This upset both the US diplomat in charge and the French commanding general. On returning to Washington, he complained, “In Indochina, we have allied ourselves to the desperate effort of a French regime to hang on to the remnants of empire…To check the southern drive of communism makes sense but not only through reliance on the force of arms. The task is rather to build strong native non-Communist sentiment within these areas and rely on that as a spearhead of defense rather than upon the legions of General de Lattre. To do this apart from and in defiance of innately nationalistic aims spells foredoomed failure.” – JFK Essentials

One might ask JFK the same question with respect to the US, or to rephrase the thought that seemed so obvious to him.

why the Vietnamese should be expected to fight to keep their country part of France (substitute the US or a US satellite).

JFK’s Lying on Display in the Cronkite Interview

The question is, how many lies can JFK fit into a 1.5 minute time in an interview?

In this interview, every single assertion made by JFK is false and is a talking point developed by the Pentagon.
Anyone trying to understand the situation in Vietnam from this interview would have come away extremely confused, mainly because of JFK’s undeclared assumptions, which I decomposed in the above analysis.

Natural Conclusions from the JFK Cronkite Interview

The interview illustrates that JFK agreed philosophically with providing false information to the public to cover up one country trying to dominate another country and prevent the domestic population from controlling their government.

There is no doubt that JFK was making progress towards listening less to the Pentagon. Many propose that JFK was about to pull out of Vietnam, and however, this interview shows JFK just repeating the Pentagon’s position.

What Would Have Happened if the US Had Stopped Supporting “South Vietnam”

In the interview, JFK did not point out and did not want the US public to know that The US government propped south Vietnam, much as the Afghanistan government was propped up after the US invasion of Afghanistan. The South Vietnamese government would have simply collapsed without continued US support. If the US had allowed the planned elections to go forward in 1956 instead of being postponed due to “excessive communist influence,” according to Diem, Diem would have lost the election, and Ho Chi Minh would have been legitimized through a democratic process.

The following quotation reinforces this.

South Vietnam was a phony country created by the CIA in the mid-1950s because this country realized that if the elections mandated by the agreement that ended French control of Indochina were ever held, Ho Chi Minh would end up ruling Vietnam. – Comment on JFK Facts

The US did not want a democratic process to play out in Vietnam. This is why JFK’s phrasing of “the people of Vietnam” in the Cronkite interview is not logical. The people of Vietnam wanted to choose the government of Ho Chi Minh but were prevented from doing so by the US government and Diem.

JFK could have helped his credibility by saying something like the following.

“South Vietnam is our puppet regime which we intend to foist upon the Vietnamese against their wishes. Without the US, there is no South Vietnam. The US pulled Diem from a US church in New Jersey and installed him as a puppet. My advisors are very frustrated that we have been unable to force down the throats of the Vietnamese people our selected puppet dictator.”

Now that makes sense and is honest, but is the opposite of what JFK said.

This interview does not provide evidence that JFK was interested in leaving Vietnam, and at the end, he emphatically states he disagrees with those that propose leaving, it is only one piece of evidence. It is necessary to look at others.

But before I do that, let us review the evidence I talked about earlier that entirely undermines the construct that South Vietnam is a legitimate government with support from the general population of Vietnam. This one point is one of the most important in understanding the Vietnam War.

The Assertions About Vietnam Being a Struggle of the South Vietnamese Against Communists

There was no authentic South Vietnam.

South Vietnam was always a US construction. You can’t say it is for a puppet to win or lose when you are the puppeteer. This is the equivalent of a ventriloquist saying,

“It’s really for my dummy on my lap to speak for himself.”

This puppeteering of the South Vietnamese government is explained in the following video.

Don’t let the child-like graphics of this video fool you. This is one of the most precise and most accurate explanations of the Vietnam War published anywhere.

Unfortunately, YouTube does not allow the video embedded in this article, as can be done with most videos. This brings up a side issue as to whether Google has semi-censored this video because it does not fit with the establishment narrative on Vietnam, which was constructed to mislead the public. I cover the censorship on the part of Big Tech and Democrats in the article How Elites Use the Term Misinformation as a Form of Censorship

Ho Chi Minh Began as a US Ally?

This illustrates the same pattern as is so common in US history.

At first, Ho Chi Minh is the US’s ally when he fights against the Japanese influence. Bid Laden, Stalin, Noriega, Saddam started their careers as US allies.

However, when each of them showed too much independence US interests, they were presented the worst of enemies to the US public, without by placing the historical relationship of each with US leadership into an Orwellian memory hole.

Oliver Stone is highly knowledgeable on JFK and Vietnam. He proposes that JFK was pushing for peace in multiple areas that the Pentagon opposed, which caused him to be assassinated.

Pulling Out 1000 Advisors from Vietnam

One of the most often relied upon pieces of evidence that JFK was going to pull out of Vietnam was that he already approved of the removal of 1000 advisors in 1963.

Planning to remove 1000 troops is undoubtedly better for the case than adding 1000 troops, but that still leaves 15,500 soldiers, and there is a likely reason he did that this has nothing to do with planning to withdraw from Vietnam. I will cover this reason and provide evidence for this further in the article.

Furthermore, the number of US troops in Vietnam increased from 900 at the beginning of his administration to 16,500 shortly before his assassination. If JFK was so opposed to involvement in Vietnam, why did JFK increase to the 16,500 troop level? Those that support the JFK Vietnam withdrawal hypothesis give him credit for the order to withdraw 1,000 troops but do not critique him for increasing the number of soldiers by 15,600 during his tenure as President.

To understand the planned troop removal, it is necessary to discuss the Security Action Memorandum 263.

Security Action Memorandum 263

This is what was contained in the SAM.

* Robert McNamara’s instructions to the May 1963 SecDef Conference in Honolulu to develop the withdrawal plan.

* A detailed account of the McNamara-Taylor mission to Vietnam that returned with the withdrawal plan, drafted in their absence in the Pentagon by a team under Kennedy’s direct control.

* An audiotape of the discussion at the White House that led to the approval of NSAM 263 (National Security Action Memorandum), which implemented the plan; this audio was released by the Assassination Records Review Board at my request.

* The precise instructions for withdrawal delivered by Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to his fellow Chiefs on October 4, 1963, in a memorandum that remained classified until 1997.

Taylor wrote:

“On 2 October the President approved recommendations on military matters contained in the report of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The following actions derived from these recommendations are directed: … all planning will be directed toward preparing RVN forces for the withdrawal of all US special assistance units and personnel by the end of calendar year 1965. The US Comprehensive Plan, Vietnam, will be revised to bring it into consonance with these objectives, and to reduce planned residual (post-1965) MAAG strengths to approximately pre-insurgency levels… Execute the plan to withdraw 1,000 US military personnel by the end of 1963…”

As a coda, the distinguished economist Francis Bator replied to my letter on January 17, 2008. Bator had served Lyndon Johnson as Deputy National Security Advisor; he cannot be accused of being what Logevall calls a “withdrawal theorist.” Bator’s opening sentence: “Professor Galbraith is correct that ‘there was a plan to withdraw US forces from Vietnam, beginning with the first thousand by December 1963, and almost all of the rest by the end of 1965…. President Kennedy had approved that plan. It was the actual policy of the United States on the day Kennedy died.’”

Could it have been reversed later? Yes. But Kennedy gave no sign of wavering in the few weeks that remained to him, despite the Saigon coup. – Who What Why

You can read the scanned copy of SAM 263 at the JFK Library.

This sounds convincing, and JFK was communicating that he wanted to withdraw.

However, when I checked the actual document, which is eight pages long and states McGeorge Bundy wrote it, I only found the text regarding the removal of 1,000 troops. After reading several explanations of what was contained in SAM 263, I found it very peculiar that I did not see any page that discussed a complete removal by 1965. These eight pages are primarily duplicate pages and filler pages.

Overall, the actual content in the SAM 263 document at the JFK Library is the following.

The President approved the military recommendations contained in Section 1 B (l-3) of the report, but directed that no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963.

How can SAM 263 be presented as evidence of a plan to remove all troops by 1965 if there is no mention of that point in the document? As the previous quote did, it is highly deceptive to tell people that the plan to remove all troops by 1965 was in SAM 263 when it was not mentioned anywhere.

Before we get into that topic, let us take a segue into other SAMs.

Go to top

On Analyzing SAMs

I read several SAMs on the JFK Library website to understand what a typical SAM was like. They were fascinating because they are documents that are not for public consumption and tell a story about the actual policy at the time. They are straightforward and “unvarnished,” as the authors do not appear concerned that they will fall into public hands. They were classified documents at the time, and we only had access to them in 1977 because of the declassification. However, this is 45 years after declassification and I just found something claimed to be in SAM in 263 that is not contained in the document.

The main thing I found unique about SAM 263 is that it was very short. Other SAMs related to Vietnam, such as SAM 249: Laos Planning explained the logic of conclusions and contained much more text. SAM 263, on the other hand, is very brief, with no explanation given other than the quote I included above.

I found some interesting quotes in SAM 249 that provide insight into the Kennedy Administration.

State Department Position

a) Move US ground force units into Thailand.
b) Move token US foces into Laos occupying Vientiane, Savanakhet nd Pakse
c) Simultaneous air strikes against selected Pathet Lao/Viet Minh targets in Laos.
b) Implement selective Category III actions against North Vietnam (Category III: Intensified harassment of shipping; blockage of Haiphong or DRV, mining the Gulf of Tonkin or ), Haiphong approaches; blocking river entrances or Haiphong channel; bombing of selected targets in North Vietnam

Defense Department Position

a) Move US ground force units into Thailand.
b) Implement selective Category III actions against North Vietnam (Category III: Intensified harassment of shipping; blockage of Haiphong or DRV, mining the Gulf of Tonkin or ), Haiphong approaches; blocking river entrances or Haiphong channel; bombing of selected targets in North Vietnam
c) Simultaneous air strikes against selected Pathet Lao/Viet Minh targets in Laos.

Should earlier US political and military measures fail to accomplish the objectives, the plan culminates in a major military action against North Viet-Nam.

Now here is the final page of SAM 249.

This is a plan for the beginnings of a generalized war against many areas of Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, that clearly would have escalated from there. However, one never hears about SAM 249, only SAM 263. Yet, SAM 263 was written 3.5 months after SAM 249.

Critical Question

If JFK was so intent on exiting from Vietnam, why does he approve of a plan for general war against not only Vietnam but multiple countries around Vietnam only roughly five months before his assassination?

Just as with SAM 263, SAM 249 is not an order, and it is a plan. However, this plan completely overwhelms SAM 263 regarding its scope and what it says about JFK’s intent. In Oliver Stone’s excellent documentary JFK Revisited, he leaves out SAM 263. I made no particular search to find this SAM, and it was just the same before 263 that dealt with Southeast Asia. You can read the entire SAM for yourself at the JFK Library.

Finally, because Rolling Stone is now part of the elite establishment, they called his very well researched documentary on JFK “looney,” and “misinformation,” as you can see in the following article.

Go to top

Now let us return to SAM 263.

JKF Clearly Communicating to Diem

One part of SAM 263 did not appear significant when I first read it, but its importance became apparent afterward. And it is this quote from SAM 263.

After discussion of the remaining recommendations of the report, the President approved an instruction to Ambassador Lodge which is set forth in State Department telegram No. 534 to Saigon.

This only seems like a communication protocol. But now it is clear why this is specified. JFK wanted the SAM to be communicated to Diem — hence the approval to send the SAM in a telegram to Siagon.

JFK had not issued orders to do anything, and the SAM was designed to be a message to Diem.

The Timing of SAM 263 Vis-a-Vis Diem’s Removal

Something else important in all of this is the date of SAM 263.

SAM 263 was dated October 11, 1963.
Diem was assassinated on November 1, 1963, or 20 days after this date.

This lends credence to the hypothesis that the SAM to remove 1,000 troops was a signal to Diem that his time was up, and that he could rely on declining support from the US in the future.

The Contingency Required for Security Action Memorandum 263

There was a contingency on which SAM 263 rested. This contingency is explained in the following quotation.

Second, while there were contingency plans to get those soldiers out at some point (possibly the end of 1965), the contingency was South Vietnam becoming successful at repelling the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. That wasn’t happening in the jungles of Vietnam in 1963. Third, there is no record of JFK having expressed a definite post-election withdrawal intention to Vice President Lyndon Johnson, his attorney general brother Robert Kennedy, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, CIA Director John McCone or any other members of his National Security Council. – Salon

SAM 263 only deals with the planned removal of 1,000 troops, and the removal of just these 1,000 troops was continent on the South Vietnamese being successful in repelling North Vietnam.

When proponents of those supporting the hypothesis of JFK withdrawing from Vietnam discuss the planned removal of 1,000 troops, they never observe either the contingency of the SAM or the timing of the SAM versus the removal of Diem. That is they look at the planned removal of 1,000 troops without important context.

When People Rely on a False Claim About the Contents of SEM 263

There is a question about the distinction between is a plan and an order.

As was just covered, SAM 263 was contingent on the performance of the South Vietnamese — something that was not going to happen. Therefore, SAM 263 as with other SAMs is a plan to be enacted.

And this is well explained by a commenter on this same article.

Our government and military have all kinds of “plans”, we had “plans” to annihilate the Soviet Union. A “plan” isn’t an order. What’s conspicuously missing here is an actual order for complete withdrawal, or even quote by Kennedy saying that he’s ordered a complete withdrawal. If he ordered a withdrawal, then Johnson would have to countermand that order, where’s the documentary evidence or quote by Johnson that countermanded Kennedy’s withdrawal order?

Plans are contingencies, and all contingencies depend on other contingencies. Sure, both Johnson and Kennedy realized that Vietnam was quagmire, and anyone with any sense wants to get out of a quagmire, but simply getting out wasn’t the problem these guys were working. You can have a plan to prepare the ARVN for autonomy, but if the facts on the ground tell you the South Vietnamese government will fall if you pull out, your plan for ARVN autonomy becomes a plan to turn the country over to the North Vietnamese. Is Galbraith really telling us that Kennedy actually intended to hand the South over to the North? Seriously?

There’s no reason to develop an alternative history here. Sure, JFK and LBJ wanted to get out of Vietnam, they just didn’t want to make the political sacrifices that were required to get out. There’s no evidence that either president intended to abandon South Vietnam to the North, and all available evidence clearly indicates that that is exactly what would have happened had the US withdrawn or failed to escalate. The most likely scenario is that drawing down to 15k from 16k would have been a gesture towards a negotiated settlement that never materialized for a variety of reasons. The argument that the withdrawal of 1,000 troops would have been the first step towards a complete withdrawal regardless of facts on the ground is simply not supported. – Comment on Who What Why

This quote appears to accept the false claim that SAM 263 included language regarding withdrawing anything more than 1,000 troops from Vietnam. This assumption is not valid and is not supported by the SAM 263 document.

The following quote is also quite informative.

Given what we know, and without access to JFK’s inner-most thoughts, I don’t believe you can answer this question definitively in either direction. The security situation in Vietnam during this period was a rapidly evolving one. There were multiple assessments over a period of time to consider. Policy was formulated in that context and was contingent upon the situation on the ground in Vietnam, as well as forecasts as to how that might evolve further. The belief systems and dominant political paradigms that took the USA into Vietnam must also be considered. This was a different world, driven by different ideas, ideologies and conflicts to the one we live in today. Context is vital. Simply pulling out a single document like NSAM 263, or promoting theories about the military-industrial complex without acknowledging the dominant foreign policy paradigms or overriding ideological concerns of the time, as researchers are prone to do, is vastly inadequate and a misguided attempt at creating causation. There’s much more to the story.

I really don’t see any justification to answering this question with simply, “Yes”. This is one of those questions that will always be debated, and rightly so, it’s an interesting one. In such a discussion, I’d be arguing for the negative, and would be quite comfortable in doing so. – Comment on JFK Facts

This quote also appears to accept the false claim about what was in SAM 263.

A Changing Situation in Vietnam

One of the major factors which makes the question of whether JFK would have withdrawn from Vietnam is that JFK did not face the same situation that later faced LBJ. After Diem’s removal/assassination, LBJ was faced with a deteriorating situation in Vietnam.

This is explained in the following quotation.

Ironically, the man whose advice usually carried the greatest clout — Robert Kennedy — did not win the day in warning against the coup, “We’re putting the whole future of the country … in the hands of someone we don’t know very well.”

Indeed, the removal of Diem brought about a worse government and far greater instability in South Vietnam. Its military performance suffered badly due to extreme political turmoil from late 1963 through much of 1965. – Salon

And this quotation.

The assassinations caused a split within the coup leadership, turning the initial harmony among the generals into discord, and further abroad repulsed American and world opinion, exploding the myth that this new regime would constitute a distinct improvement over their predecessors, and ultimately convinced Washington that even though the leaders’ names had changed in Saigon, the situation remained the same.[32] The criticism of the killings further caused the officers to distrust and battle one another for positions in the new government. Đôn expressed his abhorrence at the assassinations by caustically remarking that he had organised the armoured car in an effort to protect Diệm and Nhu. Khanh claimed that the only condition he had put on joining the conspiracy was that Diem would not be killed. According to Jones, “when decisions regarding postcoup affairs took priority, resentment over the killings meshed with the visceral competition over government posts to disassemble the new regime before it fully took form.” – Wikipedia

This famous image of a Buddhist Monk lighting himself on fire in Siagon was just one item of evidence that JFK relied upon to conclude that Diem had lost control of the situation and is what led him to approve Diem’s removal. This occurred on June 11 of 1963, or around 6 months prior to Diem’s removal.

This video shows JFK’s dictation after the Diem removal and assassination. This private recording explains JFK’s thoughts on the topic.

The following quotation describes JFK’s view of Diem and his brother.

When Kennedy was consoled by a friend who told him he need not feel sorry for the Ngô brothers on the grounds of despotism, Kennedy replied “No. They were in a difficult position. They did the best they could for their country.” – Wikipedia

The Fall Out From The Diem Assassination

This fallout from the Diem assassination, which went on and on, is one of the least covered aspects of the Vietnam War. Before performing this research, I had no idea that the Diem assassination caused much havoc and significantly undermined and weakened the US position. What is particularly curious is that although Diem was reviled by many in Vietnam, the US did not receive positive benefits from ordering his removal. The US ended up being blamed for the assassination, even though that was not the intention of the removal…at least by JFK. Here it appears that the CIA and JFK had two separate intentions, and the CIA misled JFK. The CIA obtained approval from JFK to remove Diem and his brother Nhu, but the CIA arranged it so that Diem and his brother were both murdered.

This is explained in the following quotation.

One Vietnamese Diệm loyalist asked friends in the CIA why an assassination had taken place, reasoning that if Diem was deemed to be inefficient, his deposal would suffice.

The CIA employees responded that “They had to kill him. Otherwise his supporters would gradually rally and organise and there would be civil war.”[34] Some months after the event, Minh was reported to have privately told an American that “We had no alternative. They had to be killed. Diệm could not be allowed to live because he was too much respected among simple, gullible people in the countryside, especially the Catholics and the refugees.

We had to kill Nhu because he was so widely feared – and he had created organizations that were arms of his personal power.” – Wikipedia

The CIA tricked not only JFK but those that supported his removal within the South Vietnamese government. However, like JFK, they never agreed for him to be murdered.

The Reduced Effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Government After Diem

The effectiveness of the South Vietnamese government declined between JFK’s assassination and LBJ taking the presidency. This made a withdrawal more challenging to perform without political consequences.

This is explained well in the following quotation.

Having served as an army intelligence officer in Viet Nam, I think Kennedy misunderstood Ho Chi Minh’s commitment to reunify the country of Viet Nam. I think he believed, incorrectly, what was going on in South Viet Nam was merely popular unrest against a heavy-handed.
government.

Impossible to know what he would have done when squarely confronted with the reality of a northern invasion of the south, which was underway in earnest by mid-1965. – Comment on JFK Facts Article

Political Considerations of Pulling Out

The overriding conclusion of the Pentagon Papers is that the Vietnam War was continued through multiple administrations because no administration wanted to take the political consequences of pulling out.

This is illuminated concerning JFK in the following quotation.

The second program alludes almost in passing to a withdrawal plan in 1962, conditioned on a then-optimistic assessment of how the war was going. But it also reports Kennedy’s qualms, expressed to a friend, as “We don’t have a prayer of staying in Vietnam. Those people hate us. They are going to throw our asses out of there at any point. But I can’t give up that territory to the communists and get the American people to re-elect me.” From this point, the program moves quickly to events in Saigon, to the November 1, 1963 South Vietnamese coup, and to Kennedy’s own assassination three weeks later.

But this presentation is highly misleading. In fact, Kennedy’s feelings about Vietnam went beyond mere qualms: he had already reached a decision and acted on it. In National Security Action Memorandum 263, dated October 11, 1963, Kennedy articulated his decision to withdraw all US military forces from Vietnam by the end of 1965 — with the withdrawal to be completed after the 1964 election. This was the formal policy of the United States government on the day he died. – Who What Why

The following quotes also support this.

JFK told Sen. Mansfield in Kenny O’Donnell’s presence that he wanted to completely withdraw from Vietnam but “I can’t do it until 1965–after I’m reelected.” When Mansfield left the office, Kennedy said to O’Donnell: “In 1965, I’ll become one of the most unpopular presidents in history. I’ll be damned everywhere as a Communist appeaser. But now I don’t care. If I tried to pull out completely now from Vietnam, we would have another Joe McCarthy red scare on our hands, but I can do it after I’m reelected. So we had better make damn sure that I am reelected.” (Johnny We Hardly Knew Ye p16) When O’Donnell asked JFK how he planned to withdraw from Vietnam, he answered, “Easy. Put a government in there that will ask us to leave.”

2/24/1968 Gen. James M. Gavin wrote an article in the Saturday Evening Post: “There has been much speculation about what President Kennedy would or would not have done in Vietnam had he lived. Having discussed military affairs with him often and in detail for 15 years, I know he was totally opposed to the introduction of combat troops in Southeast Asia. His public statements just before his murder support this view. Let us not lay on the dead the blame for our own failures.”

Daniel Ellsberg told Rolling Stone (12/6/1973): “A very surprising discovery to me in the fall of ’67, as I began to study the documents of ’61 in connection with the McNamara study project, was that the major decision Kennedy had made was to reject the recommendation made to him by virtually everyone that he send combat troops to Vietnam. Kennedy realized that most of the people in the country, whatever their politics, would have said, ‘If it takes combat troops, or if it takes heavy bombing or nuclear weapons, it’s obviously not worth it for us. We won’t succeed.'” – JFK Essentials

Conclusion

The Vietnam War is not what it first appears. The understanding of the Vietnam War is perverted by the false claims of multiple US administrations and the Pentagon system of producing incorrect information. In addition to these entities providing false information, I found several other writers who exaggerated the documented evidence of JFK’s intent to withdraw from Vietnam.

Here is my position on two of the widely debated questions on the Vietnam War.

Question #1: How Likely Is JFK To Have Escalated the Vietnam War Anything Like LBJ?

One question that this article has not focused on but is pertinent is would JFK have been pulled into the type of escalation of the Vietnam War that LBJ performed.

It seems extraordinarily unlikely that this would have happened if JFK had not been assassinated. The deteriorating situation after Diem’s removal/assassination would likely have promoted some type of US escalation (that is unless JFK had ordered complete withdrawal). However, Diem was assassinated in November of 1963. And the situation in Vietnam deteriorated from that time forward.

This means that not only were the conditions that were required of SAM 263 were not yet met, but things were far worse than when SAM 263 was written. In fact, the conditions that would enable SAM would never occur in Vietnam.

And it is essential to remember that SAM 263 only authorizes a plan to remove 1,000 troops. It says nothing about anything aside from these troops, and more likely than not was just JFK’s way of communicating to Diem that he was losing US support and that JFK preferred if he stepped aside.

Question #2: How Likely is it JFK Would Have Been Able to Pull Out of Vietnam?

As for the question of JFK pulling out of Vietnam, this in part relies on information just presented in Question #1.

There is little doubt that JFK wanted to withdraw from Vietnam. But the question for which there is an answer desired is whether JFK would have followed through on his desire.

Those that propose JFK would have done so leave out how the situation deteriorated after Diem and how the political costs to JFK would have risen due to this. JFK wanted, as with all Presidents that health with Vietnam to have what was called at the time “Peace With Honor,” a term later coined by Nixon.

It is important to briefly address this concept.

Go to top

How Simple and Reasonable is “Peace With Honor”

Peace With Honor was attempted with the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. As with Vietnam, Afghanistan was based upon military lies to multiple Presidents that the military was making progress. The top brass lookout for their relationships with defense contractors and don’t consider the implications on the population of the countries that are devastated after the US withdraws.

It was widely known that Afghanistan’s government would quickly fall once the US withdrew, but the top brass hid this information.

As soon as the US withdraws its support of its puppet government, the puppet government crumbles. This shows that the entire enterprise was a waste, and it keeps the US from “Peace With Honor.” Continuing support is a way to delay the inevitable. After the US withdraws, retribution occurs against those that supported the US.

The 2021 fall of Afghanistan has been repeatedly compared to the fall of Saigon.

The following quote questions how much “honor” Nixon meant.

On 30 March 1972, Easter Sunday, the North Vietnamese began their biggest attack of the Vietnam War. It was a conventional military assault, designed to inflict a crippling blow against the army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and would last six months. On 8 May, President Nixon met with the NSC and told of plans for mining Haiphong harbor and resuming the bombardment of Hanoi and Haiphong. He also told the council that he would inform the public of his decision in a televised speech that evening.

After the NSC meeting Nixon brought his cabinet together and stated frankly, “We’ve crossed the Rubicon.” As Nixon would put it to Kissinger the next day, he wanted to “go for broke” and “go to the brink” to “destroy the enemy’s warmaking capacity.” He wanted to avoid the previous mistakes of “letting up” on the bombing that he and Johnson had made in the past. “I have the will in spades,” he declared. Nixon was determined not to repeat LBJ’s mistakes. “Those bastards are going to be bombed like they’ve never been bombed before,” gloated Nixon. What followed, starting in May, was the most successful use of airpower during the Vietnam War and one of the largest aerial bombardments in world history—Operation Linebacker. Targeting roads, bridges, rail lines, troops, bases, and supply depots, the attack was the first large-scale use of precision-guided laser bombs in modern aerial warfare.

A week before the 1972 presidential election, Kissinger stated that “peace is at hand,” but again the talks stalled and Nixon turned to “jugular diplomacy.” Nixon decided that no treaty would be signed until after the November 1972 election, when his position would be strengthened by what most observers expected to be an overwhelming election victory over Democratic challenger and antiwar leader George McGovern. Reelected by just such a landslide, Nixon moved swiftly against North Vietnam.

On 13 December the peace talks broke down, and on the following day Nixon ordered that the bombing be resumed. Now his only goal was to bring Hanoi back to the bargaining table. On 18 December, Linebacker II—widely known as the Christmas bombing—began with B-52 bomber sorties and fighter-bomber sorties on the Hanoi-Haiphong area. The day prior to the start of the Christmas bombing, Nixon told Admiral Thomas Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “I don’t want any more of this crap about the fact that we couldn’t hit this target or that one. This is your chance to use military power effectively to win this war, and if you don’t, I’ll consider you responsible.” Admiral Moorer called for expanded air attacks with an objective of “maximum destruction of selected military targets in the vicinity of Hanoi/Haiphong.” He ordered that B-52s carry maximum ordnance with preapproved restrikes of targets. Kissinger wrote later that “the North Vietnamese committed a cardinal error in dealing with Nixon, they cornered him.” The B-52s were his last roll of the dice. – American Foreign Relations

Go to top

The only real thing arguing in favor of JFK following through is that by 1965 he would have been re-elected and would have been more able to handle the political backlash.

JFK was indecisive during the Vietnam War and was balancing several factors — which ended up with a discombobulated policy. He was an early critic of making the Vietnamese fight for what amounted to being part of France’s colonial system. However, when the situation was reversed and the US imposed itself on Vietnam, he was much less willing to extricate the US from Vietnam.

References

*https://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/The-Vietnam-War-and-Its-Impact-Nixon-s-peace-with-honor.html

*https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKNSF/341/JFKNSF-341-009

*https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKNSF/342/JFKNSF-342-007

*https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrest_and_assassination_of_Ngo_Dinh_Diem

*https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/jfks-vietnam-withdrawal-plan-fact-not-speculation/

*https://www.salon.com/2013/11/22/the_truth_about_jfk_and_vietnam_why_the_speculation_is_wrong_headed/

*https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1955_State_of_Vietnam_referendum

*https://whowhatwhy.org/politics/government-integrity/jfk-ordered-full-withdrawal-vietnam-solid-evidence/

*https://jfkfacts.org/was-jfk-going-to-pull-out-of-vietnam-2/

*http://www.jfkessentials.com/forum/index.php?topic=108.0