How SAP and Oracle Cheat the Commercial Software Model

Executive Summary

  • SAP and Oracle do not follow the established rules of enterprise software.
  • Both of these vendors use monopoly power to block out other vendors.


Many people like to pretend that SAP and Oracle operate under the generally accepted rules of the “free market” enterprise software segment, but this is far from the case. SAP and Oracle practice most extreme form of commercial software tactics and behaviors, pushing up against the legal rules, and far beyond what is generally considered ethical. With open source software anyone can use the software, and in most cases, it is free to use. Commercial software charges a license fee to use the software. However, SAP and Oracle aren’t regular commercial software vendors. This is because a typical commercial software vendor would sell its software for a license fee, but allow its software to be used with any other software. This is the logical basis for allowing commercial software in the first place.

Why is Commerical Software Allowed?

Commercial software is allowed as it is intended to compensate the software development entity for their investment. The intent of commercial software licenses was never to allow larger and vendors with more resources to “block out” other vendors from environments where they predominate. However, SAP and Oracle develop exclusionary products that reduce interoperability and use a variety of legal and account control tactics all designed to push the purchases of the company to SAP and Oracle.

Why Does SAP Make Integration so Difficult?

SAP has routinely made integrating other applications to SAP far more difficult than it needed to be, and encouraged the large consulting companies to talk down non-SAP software in favor of SAP software. (An easy task as SAP consulting partners make so much money on SAP consulting.)

Oracle’s Monopolistic Acquisitions

Oracle has used aggressive acquisitions to control the purchases of their customers. SAP has used the centrality of its ERP system to limit choice on the part of customers, while Oracle has done the same thing, but using its control over databases. SAP introduced S/4HANA, which was the successor to their most popular ERP application, and which had for decades worked with a variety of databases, and made the new version exclusive to SAP’s HANA database. SAP has created a number of technical arguments as to why this was better for customers and why it was necessary (a subject we cover in depth in the article How HANA is Used to Block out Other DB Vendors).

We have analyzed these in detail and concluded none of them are true.


SAP and Oracle use the commercial software model, but they do not follow the rules of commercial software. They follow a model where the commercial software is used to extract monopoly rents from customers.

Accessing Honest Information on SAP

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How to Understand the Enterprise Software Market

Executive Summary

  • The enterprise software market is far less efficient than generally assumed.
  • In order to have an efficient market there are specific requirements which include whether prices are published and easily compared, whether total costs can be compared, the ease of product comparisons, whether sellers are regulated, and whether sellers have some degree of monopoly power.

Introduction to the Software Market

Any selection of enterprise software happens within the context of the enterprise software market. Most people who write about the enterprise software market also either depend upon it for their livelihood, or write upon the topic which involves entities that are major advertisers, and thus do not have an incentive in describing how it really works.[1]

On the other hand, the academic department that might be well suited to analyzing the enterprise software market would be economics, but economists have little interest in studying how the enterprise software market works. I have performed the research on this and there are extremely few articles or papers written about the enterprise software market by economists, which is both strange and quite unfortunate because some substantial portion of the improvement in productivity (something that economists are quite interested in) is due to enterprise software.  It also means that anti-competitive behavior, which reduces the efficiency of the enterprise software market, is not called out because those most qualified to write on the topic and to compare and contrast the enterprise software market with other sectors of the economy are not part of the conversation.[2]

In writing these articles, although I am not an economist, I have applied principles of economics, such as tests for market efficiency, anti-competitive techniques applied by certain vendors, and the industry’s interaction with consulting firms and other actors. I used some of these articles in writing this book, as the nature of the enterprise software market essentially determines what is available to choose from during a software selection, and is also critical to understand before making a software selection.

Background on the Enterprise Software Market

Before we go too far down this road of the details of the efficiency of the enterprise software market, in particular, let’s cover some of the requirements of an efficient market generally. I believe this is important because one must know what an efficient market looks like before one can evaluate the efficiency of a currently existing market like enterprise software.

Requirements for an Efficient Market

  1. Prices are Published Easily Compared: In order to have an efficient market, buyers must be able to perform price comparisons. If one looks on Amazon for laptops, it is easy to perform price comparisons, allowing buyers to drive more volume to lower cost providers – making the providers search for more ways to be efficient. Producers have a natural inclination to hide prices – meaning that the buyer must spend more time determining pricing information, making it more likely that the buyer will overpay.
  2. The Product is Easily Compared or Rated by Unbiased Third Parties: If buyers do not know what they are buying and cannot differentiate between products it is very difficult for an efficient market to exist. For instance, agricultural commodities tend to have efficient markets for them because an ounce of gold or soybeans is considered the same thing regardless of who is selling. Of course, few items can match the comparability of agricultural commodities. Consumer Reports greatly assists in rating products and services for the consumer market and uses objective criteria in order to provide ratings. However, not all consumers use Consumer Reports to make decisions, and many instead follow marketing messages and salesmanship or allow retailers – who are not objective sources of information (they have a bias) to steer them into purchases. also provides consumers with the ability to compare products through the use of reviewers (although there are a suspicious number of books with 4.5 star average reviews). However, these types of tools are far less commonly available information in the business-to-business market – which is a major reason IT consultancies have so much power.
  3. Producers Must be Regulated: Efficient markets normally require regulation. This is because producers, in order to obtain an unfair advantage will often purchase their competitors in order to eliminate a competitor in the marketplace. With a competitor eliminated, the producer can then raise their prices, and reduce the investment into their product. This is the strategy of all the serial acquirers in enterprise software. In fact, these are two of the most common outcomes of software acquisitions. If the producers are not regulated, it is very similar to a competitive sports game without any referees; there is simply no incentive to not cheat. Regulating markets protects the market, but not the producers in the market. The concept of regulation is to make the markets work for the most Those that oppose regulation often oppose it on grounds that the regulation restricts freedom, but this is incorrect typically because unregulated markets are not at all “free.” They result of unregulated markets is tyranny by what eventually become monopolistic producers, which hurts not only consumers but also other producers who are marginalized or eliminated from the market by the large monopolistic producers. This is not simply conjecture, but can be quite easily demonstrated through the evaluation of any industrial sector that has insufficient regulation.
  4. Sellers Must Have Low Monopoly Power: A monopoly is technically a single seller with multiple buyers. However, this is a relatively rare scenario, and economists have broadened out the term to mean “tending towards” monopoly, as was described earlier in this book. Some types of production are so efficient when produced on a large scale – such as power generation – that they tend towards having only one seller. These are referred to as natural monopolies and normally highly regulated.[3] Wherever monopolies exist unless they are regulated, customer service/satisfaction/innovation declines and prices increase. This is one reason why the large software vendors are so poor at innovation. Sellers generally only innovate if they need to in order to compete, and many companies that say they are innovative are not innovative in the least. Declarations of innovation are constant, and predictable and are often used to justify high profits which are due not to innovation but to a monopolistic position in the market. This is explained with regards to software vendors in the following article, Why The Largest Software Companies Have now Reason to Innovate.  Now that we have set the requirements for an efficient market, let us see how the enterprise software market compares.

How Enterprise Software Stacks Up

Are Prices are published and Easily Compared?

While there is not a single answer to this question as it varies depending on the software vendor, in general prices are mostly not published in enterprise software. The software vendors that publish their prices tend to be the low-cost producers. For instance, the two software vendors, Demand Works and Arena Solutions – being the low or lower cost producers in their respective software categories publish their prices right on their website. does the same but is not actually the low-cost producer, but this is a special feature of the CRM software category, which is particularly transparent. CRM is an interesting case study as a software category as the software costs are remarkably close to one another. For instance, SAP, which follows a high-cost strategy for most of its other applications does not follow this strategy in the CRM market, and SAP CRM is about the same price as many other applications in the CRM category. CRM also has the most SaaS offerings, which appears to be an impetus to more price transparency.

Complicated Pricing

Typically in the enterprise software market, pricing is complicated. Pricing is based partially upon how many users will be on the system; a user is called a “seat.” However, a host of other factors also come into play, including extra add-ons. For instance, beyond different levels of usage, there are add-on modules or integration modules that have a separate price. Also, how strategic the account is considered to be to the software company – if they think they can gain a big bump in credibility from selling to one particular client, the price may come down. Instead, prices are given only after considerable interaction between the vendor and the company. SAP and Oracle being the high-cost producers rarely publish their prices. For instance, SAP publishes the price of Crystal Reports – advertising it in effect, but Crystal Reports is their lowest cost application (although it is no a low-cost application in terms of its TCO). On most of the SAP product line, which his typically the most expensive in any category, they do not publish pricing information. Publishing prices only where you are competitive is not pricing transparency – in fact, it is misleading. In general, most software vendors similarly do not publish their prices. Furthermore, many vendors treat requests for pricing information as opportunities to gain information in order to make a sale. Often the salespeople at software vendors will continually ask for more interactions and more information in order to “meet your special needs.” They have a series of rationales that interfere with any entity determining pricing on the basis of ostensible dedication to quality with statements such as “we don’t like to just through out pricing numbers without knowing the situation.”

Of course, the software vendors could make their pricing much more simple, so determining price would not require such extensive information. At Brightwork Research & Analysis our Product Planning Package, as well as our TCO Calculator, estimates software costs based upon variable user input – therefore if the software companies wanted to, they could put similar calculators on their websites. However, most choose not to do this. In fact, software vendors often seem to go out of their way to make their software difficult to compare with alternatives – as a result, it takes a great deal of effort to determine pricing, at least with many if not most vendors.

It does not get much more transparent in terms of pricing than Demand Works.

However, even still a number of different factors must be added up before arriving at the correct price. The pricing listed here is ordinarily simply to prompt the customer to call for more explanation.

Salesforce was one of the first to provide a great deal of transparency to prospects right on their website. Salesforce provides options for getting details about their application right on the first page. Salesforce will allow anyone to got into their demo system immediately. 

Salesforce has its pricing options declared very clearly.

Something, which helps clients, is inexpensive or even free trials. Salesforce offers very inexpensive lower level CRM functionality, allowing the buyer to test drive the application before they commit much of anything.

Rare software vendors like Ciiva provide free versions of their applications that prospects can use for as long as they like. For more fully functional versions of the software, the prospect is migrated to paid versions. As applications become more SaaS based, something, which is inevitable, we see this model becoming more common.

However, the more monopolistic the vendor, the less pricing information they make available. Oracle’s prices are nothing to brag about, and therefore you essentially can’t find published pricing information at the Oracle website.  In fact, you can’t find demos or videos of Oracle on their site either (although you can find them on YouTube). The Oracle website is all about getting prospects to contact Oracle directly.

The Elusiveness of Total Costs

So software costs are often not published, and when they are, there still is considerable interpretation required to come to the final software costs. However, these are not the total costs that the company will pay for use of the application. For the applications we have priced at Brightwork Research & Analysis, the software cost averages a little less than 10% of the total cost of ownership (TCO) of the application, and the proportion of the overall costs vary.[4] The largest cost is by far maintenance costs.

Even the rare buyer or software vendor that performs a TCO analysis will often leave out many costs. This is why I refer to almost every TCO study that I reviewed for the book Enterprise Software TCO: Calculating and Using Total Cost of Ownership for Decision Making, as a partial cost of ownership study, or a “PCO.” The TCO analysis at Software Decisions estimates costs of internal implementation (that is the cost of internal resources assigned to the project) as well as internal support costs on the business side.)

Most buyers make purchase decisions are substantially based upon this initial cost – the software license cost – rather than the TCO. In fact, estimation of TCO, particularly in any substantial way, in general, is exceedingly rare. I find this strange because there are so many white papers on the importance of selecting applications with a low TCO. However, talking about low TCO and actually producing a low TCO are two completely different things. The common presentation of many entities in the enterprise software space regarding the topic of TCO is that it is “important, but unknowable.”

With multiple factors complicating the calculation of costs, costs are clearly frequently unknown in the enterprise software market. This makes decisions making more difficult for enterprise software buyers and works against market efficiency.

Is The Product is Easily Compared or Rated by Unbiased Third Parties?

The subsection deals with how buyers interpret the products in the market and how easy or how difficult it is to understand the features and value of the product.

Ease of Product Comparison

Enterprise software is not an easily compared product. Enterprise software is a complex product which for which the interpretation changes depending upon one’s perspective and who is presenting the information regarding the product, as well as the pre-existing software that the buyer has already purchased. Enterprise software buyers will very frequently not understand much of what they are buying. This is simply the nature of enterprise software, which is one of the most complex products that any company will purchase. It is in fact far more complex than computer hardware. Increasingly, understanding computer hardware at a detailed level means understanding physics, particularly how electrons are controlled by various mechanisms. However, it is not necessary to get to that level of detail make purchase decisions, as specifications can be compared. However, the software cannot be compared as easily on gross specifications. In order to appreciate the distinctions between various applications, it can take years working in the application. As an example, I was familiar with PlanetTogether’s Galaxy APS for at least three years before I realized it contained multi-plant planning functionality, and I did not realize this until I met the business requirement on a client. Except in rare software categories, like CRM, it simply impossible to know everything about what an enterprise software application can do, and how it can be used.

The main way in which buyers become familiar with enterprise software applications in detail is through software demonstrations. Most demonstrations or demos are performed either through site visits or increasingly through screen sharing web conference sessions. Some software vendors provide online access to demonstration systems for potential customers, but most software vendors do not offer this option. Many software vendors make the argument that their applications are too complex to simply provide an online demonstration system to prospects, and there is some merit to this argument. However, a few hours spent with a person who is expert in an application is nowhere near enough time to understand an enterprise software application.

Third Party Ratings

Consumer Reports is an excellent example of a financially independent entity that provides ratings of products and vendors and is a great boon to the efficiency of the market for consumer products. Yelp is another example of a rating entity that while they cannot police every fake review written, is not known to have a financial bias towards those entities that are rated. That is, a local dentist cannot pay Yelp to change its reviews. Yelp has been extremely important in improving the efficiency of the market for local services, channeling more customers to higher rated businesses – which improves market efficiency.

Few financially unbiased media entities exist that provide objective information on enterprise software. Some of the best-known names, notably Gartner have the largest financial bias. This will be covered in specific detail later in this book. In interviewing buyers as well as performing troubleshooting and diagnostic projects for problematic implementations, it is clear that buyers are not able to consistently determine application capabilities, the level of vendor innovation, or even the fit between enterprise software and their business requirements. The evidence I present for this is that the applications that score the best in our multiple dimensions – but specifically along the lines of maintainability, usability, functionality, and implement-ability (what we call MUFI for short) are only very rarely the best selling applications in their respective software categories.

The Santa Clause Syndrome

Unlike the consumer software market, the executives who make the purchasing decisions are never the same as those people who actually use the software. At Brightwork Research & Analysis we refer to this as the Santa Clause Syndrome, and just as with Christmas, when the buyer is buying for someone else, the purchasing decision tends to not be as good.

That is, the purchase decision made for others, even when the buyer places the interests of the recipient above that of the seller; the purchasing outcomes are almost always inferior to when the individual who is to use and live with the selection makes the selection themselves.[5]

In fact, normally neither the executives nor anyone else at the company will actually use the solution prior to the purchase. Typically the potential customer will see several software demonstrations or review some screenshots. Much of what is published about the software in marketing literature— or what vendor salespeople state— is of limited accuracy or is not applicable to an actual implementation. Not understanding the distinctions between applications themselves, corporate decision-makers rely upon sales representatives, consulting companies, and IT analyst firms for this information, and each of these entities has their own financial incentives that are not only not aligned but aligned against their client’s interests.

Are Producers Regulated?

Enterprise software is not orally consumed, and it can’t hurt anyone physically, so the main form of regulation which would protect buyers and make for an efficient market would be regulating the messages that sent out by software vendors – to ensure that they are true, and then whether the statements related to functionality, such as user manuals and release notes are true.

Regulation of Statements by Software Vendors

As anyone who has worked for a reasonable amount of time in enterprise software can tell you, there is no restriction on what software companies can say. Any software company can make any announcement it likes regardless of how false, and no government agency will come knocking on their door asking for a retraction. And it gets worse than simply placing false information and puffery into marketing documentation, some of the information in release notes describes functionality that is either does not work or does not work as intended. There is no regulation of what software vendors say or what they place in their documentation. However, the government seems to have problems in regulating food labels, and regulating software for the accuracy of the “contents” would be far more complicated than regulating food labels as it is both more complicated and more subjective.

Regulation of the Concentration of Market Power

In the US, where the majority of enterprise software companies originates and is based, it is extremely rare for software acquisitions to be disallowed by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), even in cases where it quite clearly increased monopoly power – such as in the all too obvious Oracle acquisition of PeopleSoft. I have witnessed repeated acquisitions, which are clearly performed to eliminate a competitor, and while I continually hear about all the benefits of the acquisition of the acquiring company, in just about every case I can think of, the software acquired goes into a steep decline and the costs of the software rise. Within a few years, the acquired application is no longer relevant. Oracle’s acquisition of Agile and SAP’s acquisition of Business Objects, Servigistics’ acquisition of MCA Solutions are notable examples of this common outcome, but the examples go on and on. In fact, it is very difficult to find examples where the acquired application actually improves post-acquisition.

The effect of software acquisitions is to restrict choice, increase prices and allow large and inefficient software vendors that are poor at innovation to continually replenish their application base with new applications. It also substantially increases risk for buyers. At any time a smaller, high value, the innovative vendor can be acquired, and a buyer can find himself or herself sitting across from major software vendors – i.e. “sharks,” and the value proposition can turn upside down very quickly. The customers of Business Objects found out about this when SAP radically reduced the service support for Business Objects after the acquisition. The support was so poor that it became the subject of articles in the mainstream IT press.

If software acquisitions were not allowed, the larger vendors would eventually give way to the smaller and more innovative vendors. For instance, a primary reason that SAP purchased Business Objects, and why Oracle purchased PeopleSoft is that these software vendors were beating the SAP and Oracle in competitions – and this was just “too much competition,” for these two entities – and they most likely would have continued to lose market share to these vendors. The standard applied by the FTC for acquisition approval is where the combined entity would increase market concentration on what is referred to as the Herfindahl Index – which I won’t go into, but is essentially a way to justify any acquisition or merger based upon esoteric criteria that has little to do with the practical outcomes of mergers. The entire exercise is academic, because most of the employees a the FTC that have decision-making ability are out of industry, are angling for better paying jobs once they leave the FTC, and the entity has been fully captured and only in very extraordinary instances does it look out for anyone’s interests aside from the major enterprise software producers.

Enterprise software mergers and acquisitions are a major way that uncompetitive vendors can stay relevant and in control of the market, and a major if not the major way that they are able to maintain their monopolistic power.

Sellers Must Not Have Monopoly Power

The biggest software vendors have monopoly power in the enterprise software market, and this is not so much a contradicted point, as an un-discussed point. While this concept existed at one time – as is evidenced by anti-trust legislation like the Sherman and the Clayton anti-trust acts, there is very little residual idea remaining in the US culture that companies should have to follow any rules of competition or that the government has a role in keeping markets efficient.

Why the Enterprise Software Market is Inefficient

Monopoly power exists in the enterprise software market for the simple reason that there is little to no effort to keep the market for enterprise software competitive. Although many would like to propose it, there is no “natural” reason for this. Some would make the argument that this is simply “the way of the market.”

However, it isn’t. It is instead because of how the game is set up. Furthermore, the present inefficient state of the enterprise software market is quite good evidence (although no further evidence is really required on this point) that markets left to their own devices/or the law of the jungle, do not result in efficient outcomes. It also means that the deck is stacked against buyers and that the likelihood of overpaying and ending up with underperforming systems is quite high – in fact, it happens quite frequently, and it shows up in the success/failure statistics – but the underlying reasons for why this is the case are either not at illuminated or poorly illuminated by IT media entities which must be careful not to alienate advertisers and other funding sources. It should not take much of a logical leap to understand that buyers in this market face a much higher risk than if the market were regulated.

If consulting companies were not allowed to sell implementation services to the same clients they advise, the market power of the largest software companies would be seriously compromised. If mergers were disallowed, within a decade, the structure of the enterprise software market would be significantly changed for the better.

The Outcome of an Efficient and Inefficient Market

Let us go over whose interests are served inefficient versus an inefficient market.

  1. Consumers: An efficient market serves consumers.
  2. Prices: An efficient market produces lower prices.
  3. Producers: An inefficient market serves some privileged producers, but not all An inefficient works particularly against the high-quality producers/software vendors that do not have monopoly power, and works for producers that have monopoly power and prefer to provide poor value to their customers.
  4. Workers: Workers do benefit for working for employers that have monopoly power. In the enterprise software area, employees that work for Microsoft, SAP and Oracle are paid well versus their counterparts in employers that do not have monopoly power. In fact, unions tend to attempt to unionize companies that have monopoly power and tend to stay away from companies that lack this power. Companies with monopoly power make excess profits because of this power, and some of this excess profit is shared with workers. Interestingly, workers are very quick to assume that their extra compensation is because they and their company are “good” and very rarely acknowledge that at least some of their compensation is because they work for a company that has monopoly power. Workers for monopoly companies are quick to assume that the company they work for is the “best” rather than they are controlling the market through unfair competition.
  5. Innovation: This is mostly reduced in conditions of monopoly power. The major monopolistic software vendors – Microsoft, SAP, IBM and Oracle are all more known for buyer or copying innovation rather than creating innovation internally. The innovation that SAP developed was primarily its ERP system, which was developed decades ago – when they did not have the monopoly power that they do today.[6] Oracle was innovative in databases at least initially, but again that was earlier in their history. Most of their recent activity has simply been buying other software vendors in order to increase their monopoly power.[7] This change in innovation level over time is why at Brightwork Research & Analysis, when we rate a vendor’s innovation; we rate what we refer to as their Current Innovation Level. This is because the current innovation level is a far better predictor of future innovation than past innovation.

With an efficient market, more often than not, customers receive good value for their purchases and don’t have much of a problem finding the best product for their needs. Over the long term, in the absence of regulation markets tend towards monopoly, not towards perfect competition – as is often proposed by those that promote the concepts of free markets.[8] Those entities that propose the markets can tend towards perfect competition or efficiency without regulation very strongly tend to be either monopolists or media outlets that are funded by monopolists.

Making Better Future Decisions

It is important to understand that much of the information necessary to make good software selection decisions in the enterprise software market is hidden from view and made difficult to obtain. In most cases, to obtain this information you must contact each vendor directly, interact with them, and go through their process (which they control). I have painted a rather bleak picture, however, in many ways the future looks better than the past. There are several influential changes that are currently underway that buyers can leverage to improve their chances of obtaining better outcomes. The first of these is using SaaS applications. The CRM software category provides support for the theory that online and hosted applications would naturally lead to a more efficient market for enterprise software. Not only are SaaS solutions more transparent in areas ranging from pricing to the ability of buyers to experience enterprise software first hand, but SaaS solutions have a much lower TCO, go live more quickly, and have much less lock-in than on-premises solutions. SaaS software vendors must be much more concerned with the satisfaction of their customer base than on-premises vendors – and most of them know this. Arena Solutions sells most of their customers their SaaS solution, although they do offer an on-premises version. Arena Solutions knows that their success is greatly dependent upon the yearly percentage of their subscribers that continue to subscribe – and thet openly state their belief that the SaaS model more tightly aligns the interests of the software vendor with their client’s interests.

Democratized Software Reviews

A second positive feature of the enterprise software market is the rise of crowdsourcing websites that democratize the review and rating of applications. In my book Gartner and the Magic Quadrant: A Guide for Buyers, Vendors, Investors, I was openly skeptical whether a crowdsourcing website could replace Gartner, and for many executive decision makers, I think this is true. However, I have much more faith in the objectivity and validity of the ratings of applications in a site like G2 Crowd than I do in Gartner. Secondly, Gartner covers applications at far to high of a level, and I believe that many other IT analysts make this same mistake – and it is bad for decision making. The most important feature of purchasing any application is not the high-level strategic considerations that tend to be highlighted by Gartner and many other IT analysts – as any application can be made to work with the current applications that are in house.

Instead, the most important feature of whether an application is a good fit for a company is whether it meets its business requirements. Gartner and many other IT analysts have gotten away from this truth, and it has lead to poor outcomes for those that have taken this advice.

The good news is that because of these developments, it is quite possible for buyers to make much better decisions than the typical company. One strategy to do this is to stop listening to entities with a financial bias, and the other strategy is to leverage SaaS applications and more democratic forms of application review and rating.


[1] Please see the SCM Focus Press book Gartner and the Magic Quadrant:

[2] In fact, economists so rarely comment on technology that it was jarring to find an article on “The Decline of E-Empires” by Paul Krugman, one of the most prominent economists in the US.

[3] Without regulation of a natural monopoly the monopolist could charge extremely high rates. A perfect example of this scenario was Enron. While the California utilities themselves the energy market in California was deregulated under the Pete Wilson administration. Not surprisingly, Enron and other energy trading firms were instrumental in lobbying to have deregulation passed. Enron’s traders created shortages of power specifically so they could massively increase the price of power. They did this in a state that at the time had a 1/3 more energy generating capacity than they had energy demand. Enron did everything from move power out of the state to call utilities and tell them to make up an excuse to go down for maintenance during peak periods. Enron then charged many times the standard cost of the energy. While a kilowatt-hour may have normally traded for $35 with $40 being a high price, Enron would charge $1000 per kilowatt-hour. This is what happens when an unregulated monopoly is allowed to run wild. It results in price gouging.

[4] This website can be found at

[5] In fact, there are many cases where those responsible for corporate purchases place the seller’s interests ahead of the recipient, such as in cases where the decision maker is being compensated in some shape or form by the seller – compensation can come in many forms – such as seller provided dinners and gifts. Sellers provide these enticements precisely because they move the decision-making away from the actual attributes of the purchased item. This extends from the corporate procurement environment to the government procurement environment (where political donations overwhelmingly control contracts) and to doctors offices, where doctors will in most cases write prescriptions for patented drugs that often have either very similar or identical chemical properties to the patented drug. The pharmaceutical companies compensate the doctor to do this – offer “free samples” of the patented drug to promote the continual purchase and use of the drug. Patients that off patent alternatives, in the US at least, must ask the doctor if it exists, but most patients don’t do this.

[6] SAP actively reverse engineers software from other software vendors. They actually had a program that as nothing more than an enormous intelligence gather program cloaked as a partnership program., SAP lost a case to Oracle for downloading enormous amounts of its intellectual property through SAP’s TomorrowNow subsidiary.

[7] The counterexample of the relationship between monopoly and innovation is that two of the most important private research laboratories of the 20th century were Bell Labs (funded by the AT&T monopoly) and PARC (funded by the Xerox monopoly). But in general, innovation declines as monopoly power increases. Apple has been enormously innovative in its history, actually serving as the R&D entity for the computing industry. Many computer and software companies don’t seem to do much innovation themselves, but simply reverse engineer whatever Apple comes up with. It will be interesting to see if Apple can break the cycle of ceasing to push and innovate as they have gained monopoly power.

Intimidating SAP Trainers With Fake Threats to Fair Use Law

What This Article Covers

  • What is Fair Use Law?
  • SAP’s Long View
  • What SAP Expects to Gain from Writing Legally Unsupported Letters That Contradict Fair Use
  • SAP’s One Way View on This Topic


This article describes has SAP has been using legal letters which misrepresent what is called fair use laws in order to intimidate people into paying them to show SAP Business Objects screenshots.

What is Fair Use Law

Before we go into the details of what SAP does, let use take a brief detour into Fair Use.

“Fair use is a doctrine that permits limited use of copyrighted material without acquiring permission from the rights holders. Examples of fair use include commentary, criticism, news reporting, research, teaching, library archiving and scholarship.” – Wikipedia

Fair Use has a number of factors which make up how a work is determined to be covered by the doctrine, however, generally, the new work cannot simply reproduce old work. Therefore, an author could not copy 1/2 of a copyrighted work in a new publication and declare protection under Fair Use. Fair User is strongly protected by US law because of several logical reasons. First, in order to properly comment upon and critique other original work, it is necessary to use samples of the work. Quotations are of course extremely important to be able to use, but depending upon the subject matter, graphics or video or recordings are also quite important. For instance, Fox News is routinely lampooned by a variety of media outlets. News Corp, the parent company to Fox News would not, if it had its druthers, allow any of its video to be used without approving the commentary beforehand. If Fair Use were not in effect, it would allow Fox News, and any other media outlet to effectively silence criticism. Secondly, Fair Use is strongly inherited from the free speech portion of the 1st Amendment which reads..

“The First Amendment (Amendment I) to the United States Constitution is part of the Bill of Rights. The amendment prohibits the making of any law respecting an establishment of religion, impeding the free exercise of religion, abridging the freedom of speech, infringing on the freedom of the press, interfering with the right to peaceably assemble or prohibiting the petitioning for a governmental redress of grievances.” – Wikipedia

Most all institutions seek to restrict speech to the speech that they agree with, which is not really speech at all but what was openly referred to before being associated with the Nazis as propaganda (propaganda is alive and well, but the word isn’t). Companies would prefer if US law were changed so that all commentary or independent writing on the product of private companies, or on companies themselves had to be cleared through that company’s PR department.

What SAP Expects to Gain from Writing Legally Unsupported Letters That Contradict Fair Use

The US legal systems allow lawyers to threaten pretty much whatever they like in letters. It’s a very strange aspect to our legal system, but it is pervasive. Anyone familiar with legal letters knows that they are designed to break the moral of the letter recipient. Each side continues to posture moving back and forth between outrageous threats until a settlement is reached or the case goes to trial. The long the charade goes on, the more the costs spiral upwards, if a case goes to trial, then the expense level goes up another few notches.

It is extremely easy to get lawyers to write letters with impossible legal threats in them because there is no enforcement of fake legal statements. Therefore, while SAP’s attorneys while knowing that they have no legal claim, hope that they will reach some people with the letters who do not know that the legal claim is false. This can have a chilling effect on the use of SAP material, which is worth the price of sending the letters. Lawsuits are exorbitantly expensive, a fact which gives attorneys, even more, power and ability to push their weight around. Only the wealthy can actually afford a legal dispute (unless they are suing and the attorney picks up the fees on contingency). Some attorneys make their living simply sending extortionist letters which have not a legal basis to businesses. They can send 100s of letters on a topic, by simply using a mail merge program, and even if a low number of people pay out, it is still a worthwhile endeavor. The people who do pay have no knowledge that the attorney in question never planned to actually follow through on the letter.

SAP’s Long View

SAP has two objectives when making false claims about US Fair Use law. First, they want to restrict the ability of others to provide training without paying SAP. Second, they would simply deny the right to show SAP screen shots to anyone who is critical of the software. Under SAP’s interpretation of copyright law, display could only be allowed if the software company felt that the writing and coverage were sufficiently positive. Indeed, they would then be able to ask for written material to be changed or rewritten by SAP until it was sufficient to their liking. Therefore, SAP desires to not only publish false information through its own marketing and influence with publishers, but also any independent author.

SAP’s One Way View on This Topic

Interestingly I was contacted by SAP prior to my book, “Inventory Optimization and Multi-Echelon Planning Software,” being published and was asked by them if they could receive an advanced copy. I denied the request, and SAP proceeded to tell me that since they were partners with another software vendor that did have access to the book, they would simply go around my will and contact that vendor. SAP claims the right to access to material which is not even published yet, and yet they claim that people should pay for the right to display screen shots that of SAP that is in the public domain. I think the word hypocritical comes to mind.


I will be waiting for SAP to send me a fake legal letter. If and when I receive it, I will immediately publish it, along with the law firm on this blog. I will then critique the letter so that others can see the faux arguments that SAP uses. I am quite interested in getting my hands on this letter.

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How Common is it for SAP to Take Intellectual Property from Partners?

What This Article Covers

  • What was the xApps program, and how did it qualify as competitive intelligence or corporate espionage?
  • The Wellogix case where SAP conspired with Accenture to steal IP from a best of breed vendor.
  • The role of consulting companies as enablers for SAP’s behavior.
  • The need for regulations on SAP to prevent predation.


Some time ago I commented that the xApp program, which was where SAP “partnered” with some best of breed vendors should be terminated.


The program did finally become mostly irrelevant (a few partnerships persist), with partners who were ill-served by the program refusing to continue their relationship with SAP. However, what is not frequently discussed is that SAP garnered a great deal of information about best of breed vendors from this program. Many best of breed vendors entered into the partnership with great expectations, but SAP never seriously meant to help them much in the way of sales.

Historical View

However, SAP starting partnerships and then ending them, often with IP that later leads to a lawsuit is quite common. It happened with i2 Technologies and with Commerce One.

History Repeats Itself

This article describes how they mostly did the same thing to another vendor, called Wellogix. The entire article on this case is available in this article. The quotations from this article are eerily similar what has come to be an obvious pattern with SAP. Some quotes include the following:

“While SAP already had an SRM (supplier relationship management module) that could handle some procurement tasks, it was inadequate for “complex services,” according to the complaint. “Wellogix had a working version of this software, and SAP was aware that it worked in a large client environment such as BP.”

After the deal was signed, a number of SAP employees visited Wellogix’s offices for a few days in order to “kick-off the NetWeaver Partner Agreement and perform [SAP’s] due diligence on Wellogix for the purpose of either investment in or the acquisition of Wellogix,” it adds. “During the workshop, employees of SAP went through Wellogix’s P2P software code in person with Wellogix personnel disclosing parts of the code structure.”

But instead of following through with the partnership, SAP used Wellogix’s trade secrets to “replicate the capabilities” of its software and incorporated them into its own SRM products, according to the lawsuit.”

This is all very standard. In fact, after seeing SAP work this way for years, I feel I could have written this script without having actually to read the article. However, the next part of the allegation becomes even more interesting. This is because SAP did not act alone to steal Wellogix’s IP:

“In 1999, BP America hired Accenture to help it “create a paperless (i.e. electronic) process in oil field services,” it adds. “After a thorough review of over twenty vendors, including SAP, Accenture recommended Wellogix.”

In January 2002, Wellogix and BP signed a software and services agreement, it adds. But Accenture then obtained confidential trade secrets from Wellogix and passed them along to SAP, according to the complaint.

Wellogix also sued Accenture in 2008, and won a $94 million jury award against the company earlier this year. Last month, a judge lowered the award $50 million and told Wellogix it could either accept the new amount or hold a new trial.”

And this is also not surprising. I have been writing for some time that SAP is far too powerful with the major consulting firms. In most cases, the major firms simply recommend SAP no matter how poor the fit. In fact, for most clients I work with, the most appropriate software from requirements and functionality perspective is not selected. There are several reasons for this, but one primary reason is that major firms like Oracle and SAP distort the market, making is far less efficient — as an economist would consider it, than the consumer software market. There is a great misunderstanding regarding the nature of market efficiency. Markets do not automatically become efficient through competition. Markets must be kept fair for an efficient market to exist as companies desire to build monopolies. This is poorly understood generally, as even some economists (many who take money from monopolies themselves), do not emphasize it. This is the entire reason for anti-trust regulations, regulations which are generally unknown to the pubic.

Regulation performs the same function performed by referees at any game. A fair game can only be ensured by an impartial intermediary which enforces the civil rules of the game. Those who use the term “free markets” or competition without understanding this feature of markets essentially do not understand the entirety of the history of economics. The efficiency of the enterprise software market is extremely important for the efficiency of the overall economy as is discussed in this article.

Major consulting companies maximize their revenues by recommending SAP, and this is why software selections performed by the major consulting companies are essentially rigged as I described in this article.


There is a concept that a consulting company provides an “advisement” function to their clients. However, with the money that drives the compensation schemes in the major consulting companies, the concept of putting the client ahead of the consulting firm’s revenues has essentially disappeared.

However, in this case, Accenture (which is not only accused but has been found guilty) conspired with SAP to help SAP steal intellectual property from a smaller vendor. This must have caught Wellogix entirely by surprise. However, it shouldn’t have because first of all, Accenture has a terrible reputation for unethical behavior, but also because the major consulting firms like Accenture receive so much of their consulting revenue from SAP that they are almost an arm of SAP. The best terminology I can use to describe the relationship is that they are remotely controlled.


This is a perfect example of how SAP has simply accumulated far too cozy a relationship and far too much influence over other actors in the enterprise market. I am not sure what more evidence the Federal Trade Commission (the body that polices anti-competitive behavior) has to see before they step in to limit SAP’s clear and obvious monopoly power in enterprise software. It has gone from major consulting firms overwhelmingly recommending SAP, even when the solution barely exists, to now a consulting company (and I would tend to doubt Accenture is the only one) assisting SAP in stealing IP from a vendor which the vendor freely shared with Accenture. If the FTC or other body does not eventually stop the behavior, it will get worse because SAP grows bigger every year, and very simply, power corrupts.

Continuing to try to address SAP’s abuses of power with smaller parties litigating against it is insufficient for the task. The litigation undertaken by Wellogix must have been extremely expensive, and a distraction for them, and is not something they should have had to bear. I wish I could have spoken with them before they partnered with SAP to explain how SAP operates. I have been fortunate enough to warn several vendors, and I think to keep them out of SAP’s lair.

All vendors, regardless of their size, deserve protections from predacious companies like SAP. Theoretically, companies are supposed to have similar intellectual property rights. However, that is now how it is in practice. SAP claims and has superior intellectual property rights over other vendors, and routinely violates the intellectual property rights of other vendors. This has been demonstrated in multiple lawsuits, as well as my observation of new SAP modules that have copied much of the functionality of best of breed vendors that they were once “partners” with. This is why it is time to regulate SAP, and not simply leave individual lawsuits as the only defense that best of breed vendors have against a company with $12.5 billion in annual revenues, and that doesn’t seem to think that rules of fair play apply to them.

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Why IBM Should not be Allowed to Acquire Software Companies

What This Article Covers

  • What happens to software vendors that are acquired by IBM?
  • How is the public interest served by continual IBM monopolistic practices?
  • What conflicts of interest does IBM have as it also provides advisement on software areas where it offers competing products?

Background on IBM’s Acquisitions

IBM is an enormous company that does a variety of things, however the majority of their revenue comes from enterprise consulting. This does not seem to be known by people outside of consulting how still associate IBM with mainframes or hardware services. They also own a large software suite. However, the way they use their software is not like ordinary vendors benefit from their software. IBM no doubt makes a good return from their software, but the main point of the many IBM acquisitions is to sell in IBM consulting services, which are their bread and butter. Their approach is documented in this very good article which has some of the following quote:

“IBM bills itself as a thought leader, but its real business is selling consulting services. To thrive, IBM account managers try to take control of a company’s IT strategy so they can keep pushing new products. Gaughan recommends taking a collaborative or partner approach.”

I have witnessed this behavior first hand as an independent consultant on projects and can say the author knows exactly what they are talking about.

What Happens to Acquired Vendors?

IBM acquires many software vendors, but the evidence is that these vendors gradually lose their relevance over time and that they move from being innovators to laggards in the marketplace. This is not actually that damaging to IBM because they only need their acquisition to be viable for a few years before they are able to make their money back with their lucrative consulting work, which is partially at least, based on their ability to acquire firms.

What Occurs

  1. For current customers of an application, they now are hit up by IBM salespeople, and their application costs increase.
  2. The investment in the software is diminished because IBM is not able to further develop the product very much, and in fact, that is not even IBM’s focus.
  3. IBM begins recommending whatever software they purchases through their consulting business. (how a major consulting firm can objectively recommend products which it sells and maintain its objectivity is difficult to understand)

The Public Interest

The problem with all of this is that its very difficult to see how this benefits anyone but IBM. The determination of what companies can merge is a question for the government and must pass a standard of public interest benefit, or at least that is the official story. For instance the recent attempt by ATT to acquire T-Mobile was not allowed because it could pass a public interest test. ATT wanted the enhanced market power of T-Mobile, but is not interested in submitting to the type of regulation which prevent ATT from gouging customers that would have fewer placed to turn. In fact, generally the government is, in my view, far to lenient on allowing mergers as few mergers actually benefit the consumers or buyers of a product or service. However, these companies are major financial contributors. Interestingly with all the rhetoric about competition, few companies seem willing to compete, and want to grow through agglomerations and concentrating their market power with other companies.

Policy Perspective

Form an enterprise policy perspective, there is an obvious problem with allowing a company to acquire software vendors that it uses to enhanced its monopoly position particularly when there is a tie between a business that partially performs advisement (IBM Global Services) and selling software. It also has a negative effect on innovation in the software marketplace. The product CPLEX is a good example of this problem. CPLEX is a general optimizer that is used as a standalone product, but is also incorporated into many enterprise software applications. For instance SAP’s supply network and production planning modules are powered by CPLEX. However, now that it is owned by IBM, CPLEX has been captured, and I am hesitant to recommend CPLEX to a client because it comes with all the IBM overhead and manipulation of and IBM account manager that is trained to “penetrate and radiate the client.”

This is bad for clients and a waste because it means that my investment into CPLEX is diminished because it is no longer an independent company, and furthermore little future development can be expected from CPLEX. This problem is repeated with any software which IBM acquires, and they have a very large number of acquisitions in their stable. I have a number of good relationships with best of breed supply chain vendors, and if any of them were to be purchased, my relationship with them would probably end as they would then be mired in the bureaucracy of IBM. I cannot in good conscious recommend a product owned by IBM because this allows the “camel’s head into the tent.”


Mergers should be allowed where there is more than simply the improvement to the condition of the acquirer. IBM thinks very highly of itself and continually touts its research capabilities, however, if they are thought leaders why is it that they cannot develop software internally and must continually buy best of breed vendors? Buying companies based upon proceeds from another business, simply to benefit the consulting business is bad from an enterprise policy perspective. For this reason, it makes zero sense to allow IBM to acquire companies. If IBM is good, they would be able to compete in the software business without these acquisitions.

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How Efficient is the Market for Enterprise Software?

What This Article Covers

  • Why is the Efficiency of Industries not More Questioned?
  • Why Don’t Academic Economists Question Economic Efficiency More than They Do?
  • What are Several Requirements for an Efficient Market, and How Does the Enterprise Software Market Stack up in Each Area?


It is quite uncommon for the fairness or efficiency of industries and markets to be questioned in the US. Generally, people tend to enjoy simple answers that do not hold companies accountable for whether they produce positive outcomes or even negative externalities. Americans generally consider their various industries and labor under the illusion that most the economy is pretty efficient. This is a concept which is greatly endorsed by economics departments across the country. Most economists have learned to limit their criticism of the system in order to maximize their career opportunities and their ability to get tenure.

Therefore they have retreated to rather abstract investigations of things like interest rates, and stay away from controversy as much as possible.

Enterprise Software

For some time it has been entirely too evident to me that the enterprise software market is highly inefficient. Companies overpay for major brands and select software that is not even close to the best application for their needs. More on this can be read in this articleHowever, the very idea that companies are selecting the right software, is based on the concept that the market for enterprise software is efficient. An efficient market serves consumers and generally means that they more often than not receive good value for their purchases and don’t have much of a problem finding the best product for their needs. Interestingly, there is no evidence that this is the case. Below I have listed important preconditions for an efficient market and ranked the enterprise software market per each criterion.

  1. Pricing is Easily Comparable: Not in the enterprise software market. Pricing is typically complicated and based upon how many users will be on the system among a host of other factors including how strategic the account is considered to the software company.
  2. The Consumer or Buyer Can Effectively Compare the Alternatives: Absolutely not. The executives that make the purchase decision are never the same as those that use the software. Not being able to understand the distinctions between applications first hand they rely upon vendors sales representatives, and consulting companies (which are highly corrupt and regularly dispense false information to maximize their billing hours) and analyst firms, which the largest vendors essentially pay off to obtain high ratings.
  3. Sellers Do not Have Monopoly Power: The enterprise software market is dominated by vendors with monopoly power. There is so little anti-trust enforcement in the enterprise software market that Oracle was allowed to purchase, and essentially dismantle PeopleSoft. SAP was able to purchase Business Objects. Neither of these purchases did anything to improve the software and has mostly lead to either stagnation or elimination of the products of the acquired company. PeopleSoft’s product was killed. SAP has had three years to integrate Business Objects into their applications, and the only thing that has come from it has been increased prices for the product, falling support levels, and a front end which is designed to connect to the BW, which is so buggy it is unusable.

The Implications of Inefficiency

The enterprise software market is highly inefficient. This means that companies that buy enterprise software pay much more than they should have to. The industry mostly serves the needs of two powerful interest groups, monopoly vendors, and the major consulting firms. SAP perfected the hijacking of the advisory function of the major consulting firms, and since then, Oracle has tried their best to copy them. All of these facts seem to escape the interest of economists. They seem to have far more important topics to cover, like writing macroeconomic research for banks. A literature review on the topic of the efficiency of the enterprise software market returned no results.

This is a problem because the individuals with the training to effectively analyze this and make the case for enhancing efficiency don’t even seem to be aware of the problem. Again, the way to achieve success as an economist is to know as little as possible about the “real economy,” and to be unconcerned with things like market concentration, and instead to focus on the financial portion of the economy. It is amazing that such an important industry does not have economists who actively follow it or analyze it. Secondly, economists seem to not even inherently “get” technology, and seem to be as technologically challenged as attorneys. About as close as an economist will get is repeating press releases by the major vendors related to how moving to SaaS will improve the software availability — seemingly missing the point that major monopoly vendors have zero interest in opening their systems to greater competition. (These types of articles appear in the Economist magazine from time to time under a technology review edition, where economists practice misusing technology terms and clearly have no idea what they are talking about. The Economist loves quoting monopoly vendors like IBM and thinks that innovation in software actually springs from enormous firms, rather than from the best of breed vendors.)

Extremely few technology workers have any familiarity with either economics or antitrust law and have very little interest.


Because of the factors listed above, there are few champions pushing to do some very simple things to improve the efficiency of the enterprise software market. There are many things which could be done, including severely limiting vendor acquisitions, requiring more transparent pricing information, regulating the major consulting companies especially with respect to their overwhelming conflicts of interest.

However, the understanding of these problems simply seems to not exist. Therefore, it is unlikely that these simple changes could occur. In order for change to occur at least the understanding of what is an efficient market, and how inefficient the enterprise software market actually is must be first understood.

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How to Understand The Case Against SAP for Anti Trust Violations

What This Article Covers

  • How does SAP violate US Anti Trust Laws?
  • How has SAP attained monopoly power?
  • Answering the Department of Justice’s form questions for submitting a company for antitrust violations.

Background on US Anti Trust Law

It has been apparent to me for some time that SAP is acting in a way contrary to US Anti Trust Law. Therefore, I decided to perform more research on anti trust law and develop this article. The following quotation from the DOJ website I found of interest.

“…certain acts are considered so harmful to competition that they are almost always illegal. These include plain arrangements among competing individuals are businesses to fix prices, divide markets, or rig bids. These acts are “per se” violations of the Sherman Act; in other words, no defense or justification is allowed” – FTC

The Federal Trade Commission Act bans “unfair methods of competition” and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”

How SAP Has Attained Monopoly Power

Because SAP has sold software into so many areas where it offers weak products, it has become a serious drag on corporate productivity. This is very similar to the behavior of another software monopolist, which gains access to new software markets (such as internet browsers, relational databases, and content management) because of its monopoly position in its operating system. However, in enterprise applications, the foundational software is the ERP system, rather than the operating system. All other applications must eventually integrate back to the ERP system, and this gives a software vendor with a dominant ERP system, an advantage in developing other software. In SAP’s case, SAP has made integration to its ERP system particularly difficult, further enhancing its argument that integration is difficult and one should purchase only SAP applications.  This has meant that SAP has been able to bring out poor applications which are uncompetitive with other solutions but still gain success with them in the marketplace.

Applications like BW (an analytical suite) produce so little output in term of reports that much less expensive reporting must be performed by the business, because the BW reports that were promised seem to never come. The “adapters” that supposedly came along with BW to talk to all the other SAP products are so limited, that the end result is that a company ends up with both an inferior product and very little time saved, but an enormous maintenance headache into the future.

For all of these reasons, I have decided to file an Anti Trust concern with the Department of Justice (DOJ). The link on the DOJ website is the following:

For a new case, the DOJ requires several questions to be answered. The submission I plan to provide to the DOJ is listed below.

DOJ’s questions are in bold:

  • DOJ: What are the names of companies, individuals, or organizations that are involved?


  • DOJ: How do you believe they have violated the federal antitrust laws?

SAP has obvious monopoly power in the enterprise software market. This is validated the things that SAP is able to get away with. The argument against SAP has many facets and SAP power comes from the dominant position they have in enterprise resource planning software (ERP), which has allowed them, and continues to allow them to grow in software areas that are connected to their ERP system.

  • DOJ: Can you give examples of the conduct that you believe violates the antitrust laws? If so, please provide as much detail as possible.

The monopoly power is demonstrated by the fact that SAP is able to get into markets with very weak products by pushing the concept that integration with systems is complicated and expensive, and therefore companies should by either all, or as much of their enterprise software as possible from SAP.

Using Monopoly Power to Control Other Vendors

SAP actually certifies other vendors for customers. This certification primarily connects other vendors to their ERP application to these other vendors. This means that other vendors need to in effect come into conformance with SAP, and causes them to mute their competitive stance against SAP. The certifications are primarily illusory and do not mean that the company has developed a working adapter that can be used on an implementation to connect systems in reality. This is covered in this article.

Their Unseemly Relationship with the Largest Consulting Companies

SAP has for decades been involved in a quid pro quo with the largest consulting companies. SAP was the first vendor of substantial scale that I am aware of to allow consulting companies to do most of the SAP implementation work, providing the consulting companies with the basis for entire specialized practices in SAP. SAP is now a major line of business for most the major consulting firms (Accenture, IBM, Deloitte, KPMG, Cap Gemini). These companies do not give other vendors a fair hearing in software selection and in many cases do not spent time understanding what other vendors have to offer, because SAP projects are the most profitable software for the consulting company to implement. The major consulting companies, as well as many smaller consulting companies, do not match the software vendor that best matches the client need, but instead choose the vendor that maximizes their own revenues. Oracle has essentially copied SAP’s model for ERP software, and Oracle and SAP together have the greatest monopoly power in the enterprise software market. However, SAP has more monopoly power than does Oracle.

Tying Agreements?

Many successful antitrust cases have been based upon tying agreements. The typical rule is that it is anti-competitive if customers are forced to buy one product in order to have access to another product. SAP’s bundling is not so cut and dried. SAP’s monopoly behavior is not so much forcing companies to buy bundled products as it is that SAP has corrupted the decision-making process at companies that prevents them from making competitive decisions. It has already been mentioned that SAP has corrupted the advisory function of the major consulting firms. However, this is just one area of decision-making it has unfairly tilted in its favor:

  1. SAP has an extremely complex pricing scheme. This is well understood and actually written about. SAP bundles its applications in a way to reduce competition. In many cases the argument is made to me that the company wants to use SAP because “they already own it.” This is an extremely common strategy with the APO suite that they offer, and is an anti-competitive pricing technique used in other areas as well.
  2. SAP misleads customers about the degree to which its applications are integrated. For instance, SAP sells a data warehouse called the BW. It is an uncompetitive product, but is sold with adapters that allow a company to in theory quickly pull data from other SAP applications, shortening implementation timeline. However, after the company purchases the BW, it turns out that most the adapters are unusable. SAP competes with its tie into other SAP products across the suite, and positions products that would be completely uncompetitive without the “tie-in” sales pitch.
  3. Selecting a non-SAP application where SAP is the ERP system in the vast majority of cases pits the IT department, which is pro SAP versus the business, which often does want to look outside of SAP for applications. SAP has so effectively co-opted IT departments in companies that at times it can feel as if they are being directly compensated by SAP. SAP allows IT to meet their objectives, even though the software most often does not allow businesses to meet their objectives.
  4. SAP directly pays analysts such as Gartner and Forrester. Both of these organizations are highly influential, and many clients do not know that these analysts not only receive revenue from software purchasers but from vendors as well. While both firms are also paid by other vendors, the largest firms like SAP and Oracle pay the most, and it is contended by most smaller vendors and by objective third parties such as independent consultants like myself that have exposure to a wide variety of software in a particular space, that these firms skew their analysis in favor of the largest software vendors that pay them the most.
  5. Introducing and gaining market penetration with uncompetitive and non-operational products, for instance, their SPP product, as well as BI/BW.
  6. Corrupting the advisory function of the major consulting firms. Consulting firms and SAP are involved in a rigged system. Clients pay the major consulting firms for objective analysis and recommendations on what software to implement. However, SAP allows the major consulting companies to take most of the consulting work. This means that consulting firms can maximize their revenues by recommending SAP, which they primarily do regardless of the applicability of the software to the company’s business requirements.
  • DOJ: What is the product or service affected by this conduct? Where is the product manufactured or sold, or where is the service provided?

There are several:

  1. Most enterprise vendors which focus on business applications and even integration applications compete with SAP. Most of these companies are US-based. The service, in the form of support or consulting service, can be remote or at the client’s work site.
  2. SAP products injure the companies where they are implemented. SAP’s behavior is not only damaging to producers (other software vendors), but to consumers (companies that buy enterprise software as well)
  • DOJ: Who are the major competitors that sell the product or provide the service?

There are too many to name them completely, however, I can name quite a few – ToolsGroup, MCA Solutions, Demand Works, JDA, Servigistics, PlanetTogether, Manhattan Associates, and these are just some supply chain planning vendors. SAP operates in the enterprise space. Most enterprise vendors which focus on business applications, and even integration applications compete with SAP. However, many vendors fear speaking out against SAP and SAP has co-opted them through various programs.

  • DOJ: What is your role in the situation in question?

I am an independent SAP consultant who sees many of the negative consequences of SAP’s behavior. I have been working with SAP since 1997, although I have never worked for SAP. I am also not harmed by SAP’s behavior.

  • DOJ: Who is harmed by the alleged violations? How are they harmed?

Almost every best of breed vendor in the enterprise space is harmed by SAP’s actions, as our customers that end up with uncompetitive SAP products. My expertise area is supply chain planning applications, and SAP is routinely selected over software product which is far superior in functionality, usability, and maintainability due to SAP tying software models to other SAP software modules.


I have not yet submitted this to the DOJ website, and am hoping that other best of breed vendors can read this and offer even more evidence from and come up with other examples of anti-competitive behavior as well. Over time I can both update this article and then submit the completed answers above to the DOJ. 

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Anti Trust Division Manual, US Department of Justice